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Abstract 
 
It is a common intuition that we can learn something of moral importance from literature, and 
one of the ways in which we teach our children about morality is through stories. In selecting 
books for children to read a primary concern is often the effect that the moral content of the 
story will have on the morality of the child reader. In this thesis I argue in order to take 
advantage of the contribution that literature can make to moral development, we need to 
teach children to read in a particular way. As a basis for this argument I use an account of 
moral agency that places emphasis on the development of moral skills - the ability to 
critically assess moral rules and systems, and the capacity to perceive and respond to the 
particulars of individual situations and to choose the right course of action in each - rather 
than on any particular kind of moral content. In order to make the most of the contribution 
that literature can make to the development of these skills, we need to teach children to 
immerse themselves in the story, rather than focusing on literary criticism. I argue that, 
contrary to the standard view of literary criticism as the only form of protection against 
possible negative effects, an immersed reading will help to prevent the child reader from 
taking any moral claims made in the story out of context, and so provide some measure of 
protection against possible negative moral effects of the story. Finally I argue that there are 
certain kinds of stories - recognisable by features that contribute to a high literary quality - 
that will enrich the experience of an immersed reading, and will therefore make a greater 
contribution to moral development than others.  
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Introduction 
This thesis grew out of two observations that I have made about myself. First, if I look for the 
reasons behind many of my moral convictions, the first thing that comes to mind is usually a 
story. Second, the stories that have had the biggest impact on me have been those that I have 
read for pleasure, and not those that I have studied.  
I was lucky enough to be born into a family that, while providing strong moral 
examples for me to follow, never put much emphasis on explicit moral rules or any 
overwhelming moral tradition. As a result I was left to construct my own moral code without 
much outside interference, and I did so mostly - although not completely - from the books 
that I read. This process was largely an unconscious one, but now that I am aware of it I am 
glad that it happened as it did. It gave me the opportunity to figure things out for myself; to 
learn what worked and what didn't, and why, and to understand the reasons behind the moral 
convictions that I hold. I will go further and say that this process would be a good one for any 
child to follow, and since books played such a major role in it, that an engagement with as 
many good books as possible is important. 
That is where my second observation comes in. I was also lucky enough to be born 
into a family that loves to read. Books were a part of my life right from its beginning, and so I 
learned to read and to love to read, early on. I was fortunate that the books that I read at 
school, which were spoiled for me by the torturously dull lessons that accompanied them, 
were only a very small portion of the books that I read. For many of my classmates however, 
these books were the only ones they read throughout their school years, and since they 
seemed to get as little enjoyment out of them as I did, it is unlikely that they would have 
picked up the habit of reading after they left school.  
These observations go a long way towards explaining my long-held frustration with 
the limits of literary criticism. Or rather, with the limits that literary criticism, as I was taught 
it at school and university, imposes on what can be learned from a story. There is something 
that we can learn from literature - something about what it is to be moral - and I think that the 
standard approach to stories taken in schools tends to get in the way of that.  
I was fortunate in that I already loved to read by the time I reached the age of ten, at 
which I began to learn the basics of literary criticism. This was the point at which our English 
lessons switched over from learning to read, to learning about reading. The book we studied 
that year was Dodie Smith's The Hundred and One Dalmatians. I know it to be a very good 
book, but I got very little satisfaction out of my first reading of it. The fact that it took us an 
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entire school year to get through it was only the first of many frustrating things about this 
experience, although at the time it was the only one I could articulate. Instead of being 
allowed to just get on with it and enjoy the story, we were forced to stop after each section to 
answer long lists of questions. Who is this character? What has just happened? What does 
this word mean? Did we notice that the name 'de Vil' is actually the word 'devil'? What does 
that tell us about the character? While this knowledge was not completely uninteresting, I 
found that it interrupted the progression of the story to such an extent that I no longer had any 
real interest in what might happen next.  
The situation did not improve in subsequent years. Although I spent the majority of 
my free time devouring as many books as I could get my hands on, I found little value in the 
books I was assigned to read at school, and grew less interested (and less cooperative) in the 
lessons devoted to them, although I am not foolish enough to think that this says anything 
negative about the quality of those books. I overcame my frustration enough to spend four 
years studying English literature at university level, but that didn't solve the problem. Despite 
making my way through an impressive list of titles, I found very little enjoyment in the task. 
If it were simply a matter of enjoyment then I would not have pursued this any 
further. What I have come to realise however, is that my frustration with this system is rooted 
in something that is much more important. In placing so much emphasis on the study of 
literary criticism - on learning about stories - my education in English literature got in the 
way of what I could learn from stories.  
The trouble is that from the moment when children reach the age where they are 
capable of reading quickly and fluently enough to follow a novel, they are asked to decode 
what they read.  What is the plot of this story?  What does this colour symbolise? Is this a 
reliable narrator? Is this a feminist text? What does it represent? What does it mean?  The 
questions get more and more complex until, at university level, we are so used to deciphering 
the meaning of a text that we forget to enjoy the story.  I do not want to say that this kind of 
knowledge is not worthwhile.  I do want to say that those who focus on this kind of reading to 
the exclusion of all else are missing something.  This focus comes at the cost of not only the 
enjoyment of a story, but also of the lessons that we can learn from stories; lessons that are 
more powerful than anything we can learn about literary devices and methods of 
representation.   
Among other things, stories contain moral lessons. This is one of their primary 
functions. Stories give us the opportunity to learn about what it means to be moral. More 
importantly, I think that stories can teach us to be moral, not necessarily by teaching specific 
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moral lessons, but by allowing us to experience - through the story - situations that require a 
moral response.  
The question is how do we take advantage of this? Should we stop teaching literary 
criticism and start teaching moral lessons in the classroom? That seems too extreme, and also 
somewhat dangerous. I think that the moral lessons that we learn from stories - as children - 
are best learned, and perhaps only possible to learn, alone - without adult interference. So is 
the only option to go to the opposite extreme; to just let children get on with it and hope for 
the best?  
I think that there is another option. Rather than abandoning literary criticism in favour 
of moral lessons (which is dangerous not only because of the difficulty we have in agreeing 
on what moral lessons children should be taught, but also because children tend to rebel 
against what they do not decide for themselves) or ignoring the moral lessons that exist in 
stories and hoping that children will find them for themselves (which leaves open the 
possibility that they will not), we need to find a middle road between the two extremes. I 
think that the solution is to teach children to read in such a way that they are open to, and 
aware of, the possibility that they can learn something of moral value from stories, without 
making explicit exactly what that is or insisting on any particular interpretation of it. 
I will begin in Chapter One by outlining an account of moral agency on which to base 
this thesis. I will argue that moral agency requires two moral skills, or moral virtues. The first 
of these is the ability to assess individual moral rules, as well as moral systems as a whole, 
which will allow the agent to create an individual amalgam of moral content for which she 
can give reasons to support it. The second is what I am calling 'moral responsiveness', which 
is the ability to perceive the morally relevant features of each individual situation and to 
respond accordingly. An important part of moral responsiveness will be a capacity for 
empathy. The development of these two skills, or virtues, will give the agent an 
understanding of her own moral convictions, and allow her to respond creatively to new 
situations. 
In Chapter Two I will discuss the possible contribution that literature could make to 
moral development. Most directly, stories are a source of moral examples. Just like real 
people, fictional characters can serve as examples that we can respond to. In addition to this 
function, stories can also contribute to the development of the moral skills mentioned above, 
by giving us the opportunity to experience and to assess moral situations. Stories can develop 
our capacity for empathy, by giving us access to the thoughts and emotions of fictional 
characters. I will also discuss the possibility that a story could have a negative effect on the 
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morality of the reader. One way to respond to this is to limit our selection of books for 
children to those that contain only moral perspectives of which we approve, but I think that 
this will, in turn, limit the contribution that stories can make to moral development. 
In Chapter Three I will offer an alternative solution to this problem. One way to avoid 
the negative effects of any particular story is to employ the techniques of literary criticism, 
analysing the way in which the story is told in order to prevent ourselves from being affected 
by it. But this kind of focus creates other problems, which is where I began this project. 
Instead of literary criticism therefore, I will argue in favour of teaching children to immerse 
themselves in the story, entering as completely as possible into the world of the story. An 
essential part of this kind of reading, if it is to be valuable for moral development, will be an 
awareness of the moral dimensions of the story, which will allow for the exercise and 
development of moral skills, as well as providing a form of protection against negative 
influences. 
Because the protection mentioned above will be minimal, we are left with the 
question of moral content. In Chapter Four I will discuss some criteria that could be used in 
selecting books for children, based on the way in which the content of stories is presented - 
on the literary quality of the story. Specifically, realism of presentation - the creation of a 
coherent and detailed fictional world, and of complex, nuanced fictional characters - will 
create the opportunity for the child reader to develop the moral skills discussed above, as well 
as creating a richer and more rewarding reading experience. 
Defining the age group I am talking about when I talk about 'children' is difficult, 
since children learn to read at different ages. My interest is in those children who have 
already learnt to read independently, and who are therefore exposed to stories without an 
adult present to act as interpreter and intermediary between the story and the child. For the 
purposes of this thesis I am thinking of children between the ages of seven and fourteen 
years, but this is only an approximation. Many children learn to read much earlier than seven 
years, and a really good children's book can just as easily be read and enjoyed by an adult as 
by a child. 
The kinds of books that I have in mind are those that are sometimes referred to as 
'Children Classics'. By this I mean novels that are written specifically for children of 
approximately seven to fourteen years. Iconic authors who have written works that fall into 
the canon for this category include, in no particular order, Roald Dahl (Charlie and the 
Chocolate Factory, The BFG etc.), Edith Nesbit (The Railway Children, The Wouldbegoods 
etc.), Enid Blyton (The Famous Five, St Clare's etc.), F.W. Dixon (The Hardy Boys), Lucy 
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Maud Montgomery (Anne of Green Gables), Robert Louis Stevenson (Treasure Island), 
Mark Twain (The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn), Beverly Cleary (The 
Mouse and the Motorcycle, Ramona), Frances Hodgson Burnett (The Secret Garden, A Little 
Princess, Little Lord Fauntleroy), Laura Ingalls Wilder (Little House on the Prairie 
etc.),William Nicolson (The Wind on Fire Trilogy), J.R.R. Tolkien (The Hobbit, The Lord of 
the Rings), C.S. Lewis (The Chronicles of Narnia), J.M. Barrie (Peter Pan), Joanna Spyri 
(Heidi), Lewis Carroll (Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass), 
Lynne Reid Banks (The Indian in the Cupboard), Mary Norton (The Borrowers, Bedknobs 
and Broomsticks),Terry Pratchett (The Bromeliad, The Carpet People etc.), Lemony Snicket 
(A Series of Unfortunate Events), J.K. Rowling (Harry Potter) and Philip Pullman (His Dark 
Materials Trilogy). 
I will draw on a few of the books mentioned above for examples to illustrate my 
arguments. There are many more that could be added to this list, but for the purposes of this 
thesis I want to keep to those books with which I am familiar. It seems important to say that 
even those books from which I draw examples of troubling perspectives, or possible negative 
effects, are books that I have enjoyed and read many times. This fits with my project, since 
the really badly written books are unlikely to have much of an effect on their readers anyway, 
and the ability to see problematic aspects of well-loved books is exactly the sort of ability that 
will be an important aspect of moral agency.  
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Chapter One: An Account of Moral Agency 
 
In this chapter I will outline an account of moral agency which will serve as a basis for this 
thesis. The aim of this chapter is to show that this account is plausible, and that if we accept it 
- as I propose to do - then we need to give equal importance to the development of each of its 
main components in the process of moral education. 
On this account of moral agency, in order to become a fully developed moral agent a 
person must fulfil three requirements; she must accept some form of moral content, and she 
must possess two moral skills or virtues. The first of these is the necessary critical reasoning 
skills to assess her actions and her moral code. The second is moral responsiveness, which is 
the capacity to make moral judgements about individual situations and to respond based on 
those judgements. In order to support this claim I will discuss two theories of moral agency 
and development: first, the position that claims rationality is the most important feature of 
moral agency, and second, the position that gives greater importance to moral perception, or 
what I am calling moral responsiveness. I intend to show that rather than prioritising one over 
the other the aim of moral education should be to develop both in conjunction with one 
another. 
 
Moral Content 
 
Although the main focus of this chapter, and of this thesis as a whole, will be on the 
development of the two moral skills or virtues listed above, some discussion of moral content 
is necessary. I do not want to commit myself to any particular account of moral content in 
this thesis. It could take the form of a set of moral commitments or basic moral principles that 
serve as a guide for action, or a set of tendencies towards certain kinds of behaviour or 
responses to situations. In most cases I think it will be a combination of the two; a set of rules 
or generalisations combined with certain patterns of behaviour. Whatever this moral content 
looks like, my main interest is in the ways in which it is developed and continues to develop 
throughout our lives, and in the reasons that we have for adhering to it. 
An essential part of our early education involves learning this moral content, either 
through rote learning and repetition, or through imitation of others. From an early age we are 
taught by adults about acceptable behaviours, a set of accepted ways to respond to certain 
circumstances (such as sharing with others who have less than oneself, or obeying one's 
parents, for example), and a set of basic moral rules (such as 'tell the truth' or 'don't hurt 
others' and other similar rules). By insisting on and rewarding honesty, for example, our 
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parents instil a pattern of behaviour, or a moral rule, in us. This serves as a guide for action, 
and a standard against which we compare the behaviour of others. We also learn through 
exposure to moral examples, both good and bad. These examples include the behaviour of 
family members and teachers, as well as that of our peers, but also often come from stories. 
Fictional characters, particularly those with whom we identify, or who we admire, can 
provide us with strong moral examples. 
Since all of our early influences and examples will most likely be from a single 
society, the basic amalgam of moral content that we develop will be similar to that of the 
people around us. This allows us to function within our society by teaching us what that 
particular society considers right and wrong, and helping us to keep within the bounds of 
acceptable behaviour. Aside from this social function, the establishment of this basic moral 
content is important for two reasons: first, learning this moral content from her society helps 
the child to form the basic concepts of right and wrong, which will be essential for the later 
stages of moral development, and second, this moral content gives the child a base from 
which to work. The subsequent process of moral development will involve assessing aspects 
of this moral content, and then either affirming them, adapting them, or discarding them in 
favour of others. This will eventually create the unique moral content by which each of us 
lives. This process cannot even begin however, without some form of moral content to use as 
a starting point; something to assess and change. 
Despite the importance of learning this initial moral content however, this is only the 
beginning of the process of moral education. At this early stage, the child will not have a full 
understanding of the reasons behind this moral content. If she adheres to it, this will be 
largely the result of obedience to authority figures, or some form of intuition, or some 
combination of the two. In order to become a fully developed moral agent the child needs to 
go through the process of assessment and adaptation mentioned above, so that she can form a 
unique amalgam of moral content that she adheres to out of choice, and for which she can 
give an account of the reasons which support it. It is the aim of moral education to give the 
child the tools necessary for this process. These tools will include moral skills or virtues. 
I will use the terms 'moral virtues' and 'moral skills' interchangeably in this thesis. I 
am basing this on Julia Annas's claim that a virtue is a particular kind of skill. The crucial 
element of a skill is an understanding of the reasons behind our actions and choices. The 
skilled person does not merely hit on the right action by chance, or simply imitate others. 
Instead she understands what it is that she is doing, and why, and can explain it to others. In 
the case of moral content, it is the difference between following moral rules out of respect or 
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fear of authority, or imitating the behaviour of others, and acting morally because we are able 
to perceive for ourselves what would be the right thing to do and have made a choice to do it. 
The virtuous person  
is not just the person who does in fact do the morally right thing, or even does it 
stably and reliably. She is the person who understands the principles on which she 
acts, and can thus explain and defend her actions.1 
 
For the purposes of this thesis therefore, the term 'moral skill' implies this kind of in depth 
understanding of the reasons for an action or choice, or an ability that will contribute to the 
virtue that Annas describes. In order to become a fully developed moral agent, or virtuous 
person, the child needs to develop two moral skills: critical reasoning skills and moral 
responsiveness. 
 
Critical Assessment 
 
Critical reasoning skills are essential to moral agency. These skills play a crucial role in the 
making of moral judgments and decisions - giving us the ability to recognise the actions 
available to us in each situation, and the ability to reason through the possible consequences 
of each one in order to make a choice - as well as in the assessment of our moral content as 
described above. As a result, theories of moral development often place great emphasis on the 
development of rationality. In this section I will discuss the conception of the fully developed 
moral agent that results from such theories, and the importance of critical reasoning for moral 
agency. 
One theory of moral development that emphasises the importance of rationality is 
found in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, who distinguishes three levels of moral 
development. He divides these further into six stages, but for my purposes the three main 
groupings will suffice. At the first, preconventional, level, a child is responsive to moral 
rules, but interprets them first in terms of reward or punishment and later in terms of the 
instrumental satisfaction of need. At the second, conventional, level, there is a focus on 
conforming to the expectations of a family, society or religion, and approval from these 
groups is seen as valuable in its own right, regardless of other consequences. At this level, 
right behaviour is judged in terms of what is pleasing or acceptable to others, the behaviour 
of the majority and respect for authority. At the final, postconventional, level, the focus shifts 
to the validity of moral values and principles independent of social convention. Right action 
is defined in terms of individual rights and standards of behaviour agreed on by society, and 
                                                          
1
 Annas, 67 
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there is an awareness of the relativism of personal values. In the final stage on this level, right 
action is defined by “the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical 
principles”.2 
Rationality is of great importance to the final level described above. It is through 
critical reasoning that we are able to determine the validity of moral values and principles 
without relying on social convention or sources of authority. Although we still make use of 
social conventions - such as the individual rights and acceptable behaviours agreed upon by 
society - critical reasoning gives us the ability to assess these conventions and to develop 
reasons for complying, or not complying, with these conventions. By making use of our 
knowledge of these rights and standards of behaviour in combination with critical reasoning, 
we can make judgements about right action. In most societies, for example, social convention 
requires that we are honest in our dealings with others. We teach our children this practice, 
and expect them to conform to it, but simple conformity is insufficient for moral agency, and 
so we also teach them the reasons that underlie the convention, as well as the skills to search 
for those reasons themselves. At the highest level of moral development the decision to act 
honestly will be the result of a process of reasoning, considering alternative courses of action 
and their possible consequences before deciding on one. Making a moral commitment to act 
honestly at all times is a generalisation of these individual decisions. Critical reasoning does 
not cease to operate at this point however, because there may be situations in which adhering 
to this moral commitment or rule is inappropriate - when telling the truth could result in 
harm, for example - and critical reasoning is required in order to choose an alternative course 
of action. The end result of this process is that the amalgam of moral content that we develop 
is based on ethical principles, for which we can give a rational explanation and justification. 
The ideal moral agent on this type of account then will be someone who is capable of 
understanding the reasons behind the moral rules that she follows, and who chooses to follow 
them as a result of this understanding. In addition to this, she will have the critical reasoning 
skills necessary to assess her own moral system, and to recognise when there is a need for 
individual aspects of moral content to be altered. 
The critical assessment of moral rules and systems can take two forms, both of which 
are necessary for moral agency. First, we can assess a moral system on its own terms, and 
second, we can assess it in comparison with other moral systems or in terms of metaethical 
principles. To assess a moral system on its own terms requires the ability to recognise 
                                                          
2
 Kohlberg, 55 
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inconsistencies within the system, such as when the application of a moral rule in a particular 
situation will contradict some central ideal or moral principle. This will require an 
understanding of these central moral principles that is comprehensive enough to enable us to 
recognise when such a situation arises. Take for example the moral rule that we should 
always tell the truth. If we encounter a situation in which telling the truth will result in some 
kind of harm - such as allowing a murder to take place - then following that particular rule in 
this situation would be contrary to the moral principle that, for example, we ought to preserve 
life whenever possible, or that we should not assist those who intend to do harm, or 
something along those lines. This situation requires that we make an exception to the moral 
rule that we should always tell the truth, in order to avoid acting against one of our central 
moral principles. To assess a moral system as a whole requires that we search for a 
justification for our adherence to it. This can involve comparing it with other moral systems 
that are based on different moral ideals, or searching for metaethical principles that can serve 
as justification for our ideals. For this kind of assessment to be possible, we first need to have 
knowledge that other moral systems exist, some of which will be based on ideals that 
contradict our own, and an understanding of these ideals. Once we have this knowledge, we 
can make use of critical reasoning to compare and contrast these systems with our own, and 
to search for metaethical principles that will give us the means to choose between them. 
Critical reasoning skills are therefore essential to moral agency, and the development 
of these skills will be an important part of moral education. While these skills are necessary 
however, I do not think that they are sufficient for moral agency. In the following section I 
will discuss a third requirement - moral responsiveness - and show that this is also necessary 
for moral agency. 
 
Moral Responsiveness 
 
The theory of moral agency discussed above, with its emphasis on rationality, is closely 
connected to the conception of the rational self as the true self. However, this kind of 
conception could lead to a lack of awareness of, and attention to, other aspects of the self, 
which include emotions and desires. These other aspects of the self, and not only the rational 
self, will play a role in determining our actions and moral choices, and so a successful theory 
of moral agency should take these into account. In this section I will claim that in addition to 
critical reasoning skills, moral agency also requires moral responsiveness. Morality is both 
cognitive and affective, and what I call moral responsiveness is that element of moral agency 
that makes use of our emotions. In order to develop moral responsiveness therefore, moral 
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education needs to focus on two areas: first, the development of a particular way of 
perceiving moral situations, which will necessarily involve emotions, and second, the 
development of a capacity for empathy.  
If we conceive of moral beings as primarily rational beings, then moral agents will 
require only the most general of moral concepts, such as 'good' and 'right', and so any theory 
that holds rationality to be the most important aspect of moral agency will focus on 
definitions of these concepts and the theories of right action that follow from these 
definitions. Simon Haines argues that this creates a problem, because he claims that when we 
talk about obligation or duty, or of moral right and wrong, we are relying on a conception of 
morality that no longer survives. The modern sense of the word 'moral' 
implying an implicit compulsion to act in a certain way, depends … on the survival of 
a law conception of ethics, and ultimately a divine law conception, which only makes 
sense within the now-collapsed Judeo-Christian framework.3 
 
The absence of this framework means that morality is reduced to a few elementary common 
denominators. Being largely abstract and separated from our actual experience of the world, 
these common denominators serve little practical purpose. For example, the abstract rule 'tell 
the truth', as I discussed above, must sometimes be disregarded because of the circumstances 
in which we find ourselves. Instead of these abstract concepts, Haines argues that what is 
needed is a moral vocabulary that gives weight to the moral concepts that we use. He claims 
that what is needed is a greater knowledge and understanding of the historical context from 
which these moral concepts are drawn. However, I think that this weight need not come only 
from this knowledge of context. An alternative is to focus on gaining a deeper understanding 
of the emotional underpinnings of moral concepts. In order to understand moral concepts we 
need to live within them, to experience them, which I will argue necessarily involves an 
emotional component. To attempt to separate the affective and cognitive elements of moral 
perception is to impoverish our understanding of moral concepts. 
There is a close connection between moral judgments and emotions. The judgment 
that a moral rule has been violated generally elicits a negative emotional response. In his 
argument for the claim that “emotions co-occur with moral judgements”,4 Jesse Prinz cites 
scientific studies that show a connection between making a moral judgment and activity in 
the part of the brain that controls emotions. It is difficult, in practice, to separate moral 
judgments from these emotional responses. However, this is often the stated aim of theories 
                                                          
3
 Haines, paraphrasing Anscombe, 23 
4
 Prinz, 30 
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of moral development that give priority to rationality; to make moral judgments through 
rational deliberation without allowing emotions to interfere. Emotions need not be an 
interference however, since they are a central part of how we interact with others. Behaviour 
and character can often only be made sense of “in terms of an underlying structure of 
emotion”,5 which is connected to the way that we respond to one another, and with the ways 
in which we make judgments about how to act. 
In the same way that making a moral judgment elicits an emotional response, 
emotions can have an effect on our moral judgments. A negative emotion “can give rise to a 
negative moral appraisal without any specific belief about some property in virtue of which 
something is wrong”.6 This is what we often refer to as moral intuition. We have a feeling 
that something is either right or wrong, or that someone has a good or a bad character, even 
when we have no rational support or evidence for the feeling and so cannot explain why we 
have it. These intuitions are not always correct, but nevertheless we do use our emotions as a 
guide for our moral judgments. 
Given this connection between the two, it seems that emotions will play an important 
role in moral development. Prinz observes that children have to be trained to conform to 
moral rules, and further, that the methods generally used by parents and teachers all involve 
emotions in some way.7 The three main techniques that he describes are the assertion of 
power, which elicits fear in a child, alerting the child to the harm she has caused someone 
else, which causes distress, and the withdrawal of love (which can also take the form of social 
ostracism) which causes sadness. In each case, emotions are used as a tool for moral teaching 
and enforcement. 
Prinz makes the further claim that “emotions are also necessary in a synchronic 
sense”.8 If a person makes a moral judgment, such as 'killing is wrong' for example, but does 
not have any negative emotions towards the idea of killing, then it is difficult to see how that 
person could be sincere in making that moral judgment. A complete lack of emotional 
response to moral situations could be seen as a kind of moral blindness. He argues that 
cultural differences in moral values provide indirect support for this view, stating that “if 
moral values are not driven by reason or observation, then it is plausible to think they hinge 
on culturally inculcated passions”.9 In other words, the differences that we find between the 
                                                          
5
 Haines, 32 
6
 Prinz, 31 
7
 Prinz, 31 
8
 Prinz, 32 
9
 Prinz, 33 
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moral systems of different cultures give support to the idea that these moral systems are not 
so much the result of rational deliberation and choice, as the result of culturally reinforced 
emotional responses to certain acts or situations.  
This claim does not mean that we can never make dispassionate moral judgments. We 
can make the moral judgment that killing is wrong by using rational deliberation, and 
emotions need not necessarily play a role in making the general judgment. When we are 
confronted with a particular situation however, such as a murder, we should feel some form 
of negative emotion towards the act. Emotion serves as a condition for sincerity. We do not 
always have to feel the attendant emotions in order to make a moral judgment, but if we 
never feel them at all then we cannot be said to hold that particular moral judgment to be true. 
Emotion plays another important role in moral understanding, in the form of empathy, 
which David Pizarro defines as a “primary moral emotion”,10 and which serves as a moral 
indicator. Empathy involves feeling the emotions of another person, and helps us to identify 
situations that require a moral response. Once we have recognised that a moral response is 
necessary, emotions then serve as a basis for moral judgments, providing us with an initial 
and immediate response to the situation, on which we can base our judgment about what 
action is required. 
Given this correlation between emotions and moral judgments, and that emotions can 
have an effect on our moral judgments, it makes sense that the development of full moral 
agency will require that we take emotions into account. Teaching a child how to understand 
and make use of emotions in connection with moral judgments will therefore be an important 
part of moral education, and this will take the form of the development of moral 
responsiveness. 
Moral responsiveness is the ability to perceive and respond to the particulars of 
individual moral situations, and to make use of our emotional responses and intuitions in 
order to act rightly. Moral responsiveness is akin to the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, or 
practical wisdom.11 Virtue, for Aristotle, is closely connected to practical wisdom, which is 
the ability to choose the right course of action in each set of circumstances. It is a “capacity 
for thinking correctly about how to respond to particular circumstances as they arise”,12 and 
is what allows us to determine the mean – the virtuous response – in each situation. A 
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virtuous person is therefore someone who is “characterised by a certain state of receptivity”13 
to the world and to other people. 
Practical wisdom is the common cognitive element of all the virtues, and is therefore 
closely connected with a capacity for critical reasoning. However, rather than the rigid 
application of a rationally defined moral code, it involves a particular way of seeing, an 
openness to the particulars of situations and the ability to notice and take those into account 
and so choose the right course of action. John McDowell argues that it is inevitable that 
situations will arise 
in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong – and not 
necessarily because one has changed one’s mind; rather one’s mind on the matter 
[will not be] susceptible of capture in any universal formula.14 
 
In such cases, where a moral rule cannot be found that is applicable, the right course of action 
must be found through some other means, drawn from the situation itself. Practical wisdom is 
important for this, but it is not enough on its own. An important component of virtuous action 
in the Aristotelian picture is having the right feelings about one's actions or about a situation 
and so emotions will play an important role in choosing the right course of action. Since it is 
empathy that alerts us to the necessity of a moral response, empathy will be an essential 
component of moral agency. Morality is other-directed, and so an ability to imagine or to 
experience the feelings of others will be necessary, or at least beneficial, to making moral 
decisions. It is from this experience or imagining of emotion that we will draw the means to 
make the right decision is each particular situation. 
Empathy is defined as “a vicarious, spontaneous sharing of affect”,15 caused by 
witnessing, hearing about, imagining, or even reading about the emotional state of another 
person. Empathy can be distinguished from sympathy, which is “feelings for another”.16 
Sympathy involves concern for another and for his well-being, and more specifically, concern 
for his sake. Empathy, on the other hand, involves feeling what the other person feels, or 
rather, what we imagine or believe that the other feels or could be expected to feel given the 
circumstances. Empathy is the result of emotional contagion, which is “the communication of 
one’s mood to others”,17 and which is an important part of the way that we interact socially. 
We mimic the facial expressions, vocalisations and postures of other people, and so learn to 
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recognise these things as indicators of mood, which aids us in communicating with each 
other. If empathy is an advantage in social interaction, it is reasonable to think that it will also 
be an advantage in making moral judgments. 
It is possible that, unlike sympathy, empathy need not involve concern for the well-
being of the other, and Stephen Darwall argues that it can in fact be consistent with “the 
indifference of pure observation or even the cruelty of sadism”.18 If this is the case, it might 
be better to advocate the importance of sympathy, rather than empathy, for moral 
responsiveness. However, while a concern for the well-being of others is certainly a good 
thing, more important for moral agency is an understanding of the feelings of others. 
Sympathy is too closely connected to the self, to the feelings that the agent herself has for the 
other person. Empathy, on the other hand, need not involve the feelings of the agent herself. 
It is a  
more precisely sensitive receptivity to the suffering of another or others through 
available data; and awareness, understanding and experience of humanity and human 
suffering.19 
 
Empathy gives us a deeper insight into the feelings of others than sympathy, and will 
therefore be more valuable for moral agency. This is not to say that sympathy is unimportant, 
but it is likely that sympathy will follow naturally from empathy. Pizarro distinguishes 
between two kinds of empathy.20 Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand the point of 
view and emotions of another person. This form of empathy is closely connected to what we 
believe the emotions of the other person to be, or what we believe their emotions are likely to 
be given the circumstances. Affective empathy is the vicarious emotional response that, in 
some cases, accompanies the understanding gained through cognitive empathy. For example, 
we can understand, in a cognitive sense, that someone who has lost a loved one will feel 
grief, but this is not the same thing as feeling grief ourselves. Affective empathy involves 
feeling that grief along with the other person. While it is possible to have one without the 
other, I think that to have a capacity for both will be a significant advantage to moral agency. 
In cases where we do not feel sympathy for the other, affective empathy may serve as a 
means of generating sympathy. If we can experience, even briefly, the feelings of another, 
then it is not so great a step to having feelings for them, and to feeling concern for their well-
being. 
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I stated above that the development of moral responsiveness will require moral 
education to focus on both the development of a particular way of perceiving moral situations 
and the development of a capacity for empathy. One way to achieve the first of these goals is 
to conceive of morality as a form of thought in itself, as opposed to being based on any 
particular content, or as derived from authority.21 Barbara Cowell draws an analogy with 
science education which, particularly at the higher levels, is not about imparting content to 
students, but rather about teaching them a method of approach; a way of thinking about 
scientific questions. In a similar manner, moral education is not so much about teaching 
children moral rules, but rather about teaching them how to approach moral situations. 
In conclusion, moral agency requires a certain kind of perception, an openness to the 
world and to other people. Part of the process of moral education is therefore teaching a child 
to perceive moral situations in a certain way. Cowell suggests that this is done by working 
with the moral intuitions of the child, and showing her how those intuitions should be 
modified or acted upon depending on the details of the circumstances. The use of emotions 
will often play a role here, such as in the methods described above in which parents use 
negative emotions to reinforce moral lessons, drawing the child's attention to the morally 
relevant features of the situation. This is similar to the Aristotelian conception of acquiring 
virtue first through imitation of a more accomplished person and later through an 
understanding of the appropriate response to moral situations. The child's intuitions are 
initially modified through an encounter with an adult, who gives her an example to follow in 
that particular situation. Moral education makes use of many of these encounters with the aim 
of helping the child to reach the point where she can perceive for herself which of her 
intuitions are appropriate and which are not in any given situation. 
As discussed above, one of the most important tools available to us in the 
development and exercise of moral perception is emotion. Our emotional responses to 
situations, as well as the ability to recognise and respond to the emotions of other people, are 
a central part of moral agency, and so the development of this kind of moral perception, or 
moral responsiveness, will be important for moral agency. 
 Both reason and emotion will therefore be important for moral agency, and so we 
cannot prioritise one over the other. In order to allow for the development of full moral 
agency, moral education needs to focus on developing both critical reasoning skills and moral 
responsiveness.  
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Chapter Two: The Role of Literature 
 
In Chapter One I outlined an account of moral agency that includes three necessary 
components: first, the acceptance of some form of moral content, second, the ability to make 
use of critical reasoning skills in order to assess moral rules and systems, and third, a capacity 
for moral responsiveness. In this chapter I will discuss whether an engagement with literature 
could contribute to the development of these three requirements. 
It is important to note that our engagement with literature alone will not be sufficient 
for the development of moral agency. At best, literature can make a contribution to moral 
education, which must be combined with other aspects of education in order to be effective. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss exactly what this contribution could be, and how it 
might work, with a view to determining how we can best take advantage of it. 
It is also important to note that whatever the effects of literature on moral 
development may be, it is by no means certain that these effects will all be positive ones. The 
fully developed moral agent described in Chapter One could perhaps engage with any story 
and take only positive effect from it. However, since my focus is on the development of 
moral agency, the kind of reader with whom I am concerned will not yet be a fully developed 
moral agent. In this chapter therefore, I will deal first with the positive contributions that 
literature could make to moral development, and then discuss some concerns that have been 
raised about the possible negative effects of imaginative engagement with stories. I will offer 
a possible solution to the problems that these concerns present in Chapter Three. 
 
The Role of the Imagination 
 
Our engagement with literature is an engagement through the imagination, and so if literature 
is to play any role in moral development it will most likely be through the development of the 
imagination. The role of the imagination in moral development is twofold: first, one of the 
ways in which we learn about the world and other people is through the imagination, and 
second, the imagination itself will play a role in moral agency. In this section I will discuss 
the first of these roles. The second is closely connected to moral responsiveness, and will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The use of conceptual imagining - which involves imagining the truth of a proposition 
in order to see what would follow from it - is fairly common in education. We also make use 
of this kind of thinking in order to make decisions by imagining the possible consequences of 
our actions. Of course, knowledge of the real world is indispensible for this, but it is the 
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imagination that allows us to utilise that knowledge in making decisions. We imagine 
different possible futures, and choose the action that we think most likely to lead to the future 
that we want. 
In addition to this use of the imagination, there is a second form of imagination which 
Berys Gaut terms "experiential imagining". This involves more than simply imagining the 
truth of a proposition. It involves imagining what it would be like, or what it would feel like, 
if that proposition were true, or if a particular course of events were to take place. It is “a 
matter of entertaining a sensory or phenomenal thought without commitments to the thought-
content’s truth or instantiation”.22 It is this kind of imagination that we use when we are 
asked to put ourselves 'in someone else's shoes', or in other words, to empathise with them. 
Experiential imagining is what is involved in our engagement with fiction, and will be 
important for moral development and agency. Gaut argues that the more vividly we imagine 
something the more we will learn from the imagining and that since morality concerns both 
motivations and feelings 
moral learning not only involves knowing that such-and-such is the case … but is also 
concerned with knowing how to act and how to feel.23 
 
Experiential imagining will therefore play an important role in moral learning, since it 
involves an imaginative acquaintance with the situation, beliefs, desires and emotions of 
another person or persons. 
If literature contributes to moral education then, it is likely that it will do so by 
developing our capacity for imagination. Given that some people have a greater capacity for 
imagination than others, it makes sense that we can “benefit from being guided in our 
imaginings by those with greater imaginative talents than we possess”.24 Gaut argues that 
artists, writers and poets are drawn from those people who have great imaginative ability, and 
art and literature provides such people with a platform from which to guide others. 
 
Moral Content 
The moral content of a story is similar to the moral content of the real world. In every society 
there are moral rules, accepted standards of behaviour, and implied views about what it 
means to be a good person and about what virtue is. A story contains the same sort of moral 
content, to a greater or lesser degree of complexity. Sometimes there is an explicit moral 
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claim that a story is demonstrating or reinforcing (such as in fables), and sometimes there is 
not. Engaging with a story is not unlike spending time in a particular society. There will 
always be some form of moral context in which the events of the story take place, which is 
expressed in the speech and behaviour of the characters as they react to those events, and 
emphasised through the way in which the story is told.  
Throughout this thesis I will be working with a distinction between the moral content 
in a story, and the moral content of a story. The two are very closely linked to one another, 
but there is a subtle distinction to be made between them. The moral content in the story 
refers to the moral status of the actions of characters, and the stated or implied beliefs of 
those characters. This moral status is, to a certain limited extent, independent from the beliefs 
or attitudes of the author. Any action or interaction between characters will have this moral 
status. A murder, for example, has moral status, as does a lie, or an act of kindness. 
Such actions can be written or told about in such a way as to present only the action 
itself. However, a story does more than just present us with the facts about actions and 
events. It tells us about these things in such a way as to create certain reactions in us. A story 
asks us to feel something about what it describes, to view it in a certain way. This is the 
moral content of the story, made up by the choices the author makes about how to portray the 
moral content in the story. 
As an example, consider J.K. Rowling's Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince. The 
climax of the book is the death of Headmaster Albus Dumbledore at the hands of Severus 
Snape, who confirms by this action his status as a Death Eater, the name given to followers of 
the evil Lord Voldemort. A simple statement of fact, such as “Snape killed Dumbledore”,25 
describes an action that has a moral status, but does little else. In isolation, it has little impact. 
What gives that statement weight is the entirety of the story; in which the killings perpetrated 
by Death Eaters are condemned, and Dumbledore serves as the leader of those fighting 
against them. The combination of these things changes that simple statement of fact into 
something terrible. It is the loss of a cherished guide and father figure, and the confirmation 
(at this point in the story anyway) of our worst suspicions about Snape. The action is 
therefore portrayed in a completely negative way. Interestingly, the same action is portrayed 
in a different light in the following novel in the series, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, 
when Snape gives Harry access to his memory of a conversation with Dumbledore. Having 
discovered that Voldemort intends to have Draco Malfoy murder him, and also that, due to a 
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cursed injury, he cannot expect to live longer than a year in any case, Dumbledore asks Snape 
to kill him. 
'Ultimately, of course, there is only one thing to be done if we are to save him 
from Lord Voldemort's wrath.' 
Snape raised his eyebrows and his tone was sardonic as he asked, 'Are you 
intending to let him kill you?' 
'Certainly not. You must kill me.' 
There was a long silence, broken only by an odd clicking noise. Fawkes the 
phoenix was gnawing a bit of cuttlebone. 
'Would you like me to do it now?' asked Snape, his voice heavy with irony. 
'Or would you like a few moments to compose an epitaph?' 
'Oh, not quite yet,' said Dumbledore, smiling. 'I daresay the moment will 
present itself in due course. Given what has happened tonight,' he indicated his 
withered hand, 'we can be sure that it will happen within a year.' 
'If you don't mind dying,' said Snape roughly, 'why not let Draco do it?' 
'That boy's soul is not yet so damaged,' said Dumbledore. 'I would not have it 
ripped apart on my account.' 
'And my soul, Dumbledore? Mine?' 
'You alone know whether it will harm your soul to help an old man avoid pain 
and humiliation,' said Dumbledore. 'I ask this one, great favour of you, Severus, 
because death is coming for me as surely as the Chudley Cannons will finish bottom 
of this year's league. I confess I should prefer a quick, painless exit to the protracted 
and messy affair it will be if, for instance, Greyback is involved - I hear Voldemort 
has recruited him? Or dear Bellatrix, who likes to play with her food before she eats 
it.' 
His tone was light, but his blue eyes pierced Snape as they had frequently 
pierced Harry, as though the soul they discussed was visible to him. At last Snape 
gave another curt nod.26 
 
This conversation means that Harry, and the reader, is asked to take a very different view of 
Snape's actions. Instead of a cold-blooded murder, Snape killing Dumbledore is portrayed as 
an act of mercy. The moral content in the story changes, because we are given new 
information, but this is also a difference in the moral content of the story. The same action 
can be portrayed in either a positive or a negative light. The choices that the author makes in 
how the moral content in a story is portrayed will make up the moral content of that story. 
Perhaps the simplest way that literature can contribute to moral development is by 
providing children with moral examples to be either emulated or avoided. Fictional 
characters, particularly those that children admire, or with whom they identify, provide role 
models for action in much the same way that real people do. These examples are one of the 
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sources from which we draw moral content. The example itself - of a particular kind of action 
or behaviour, such as violence, for example - will be a part of the moral content in the story, 
but whether that example is one to be followed or avoided is determined by the moral content 
of the story.  
In Frances Hodgson Burnett's A Little Princess for example, the heroine, Sara Crewe, 
uses her trick of pretending to be a princess as both a source of strength in difficult times, and 
as a code of behaviour. When her wealthy father sends her to a boarding school in England, 
Sara finds that her only true difficulty is how much she misses him. Her natural kindness and 
boundless imagination help her to make friends among her schoolfellows, and the worldly 
headmistress treats her well because of her wealth. Although she might easily have become 
self-satisfied and spoilt, her belief that a princess would be always even-tempered, gracious, 
generous and kind serves as an ideal which she does her best to live up to at all times. The 
passage below is the first test of her ability to do so. An older pupil who is jealous of Sara has 
heard of her latest imagining, and uses it to attack her when Sara defends one of the younger 
girls, to whom Sara is something of an adopted mother. 
Sara got up quickly on her feet.  It must be remembered that she had been very deeply 
absorbed in the book about the Bastille, and she had had to recall several things 
rapidly when she realised that she must go and take care of her adopted child.  She 
was not an angel, and she was not fond of Lavinia. 
'Well,' she said, with some fire, 'I should like to slap you - but I don't want to 
slap you!' restraining herself.  'At least, I both want to slap you - and I should like to 
slap you - but I won't slap you.  We are not little gutter children.  We are both old 
enough to know better.' 
Here was Lavinia's opportunity. 
'Ah, yes, your royal highness,' she said.  'We are princesses, I believe.  At least 
one of us is.  The school ought to be very fashionable now Miss Minchin has a 
princess for a pupil.' 
Sara started towards her.  She looked as if she were going to box her ears.  
Perhaps she was.  Her trick of pretending things was the joy of her life.  She never 
spoke of it to girls she was not fond of.  Her new 'pretend' about being a princess was 
very near to her heart, and she was shy and sensitive about it.  She had meant it to be 
rather a secret, and here was Lavinia deriding it before nearly all the school.  She felt 
the blood rush up to her face and tingle in her ears.  She only just saved herself.  If 
you were a princess, you did not fly into rages.  Her hand dropped, and she stood 
quite still a moment.  When she spoke it was in a quiet, steady voice; she held her 
head up, and everybody listened to her. 
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'It's true,' she said.  'Sometimes I do pretend I am a princess.  I pretend I am a 
princess, so that I can try and behave like one.'27 
 
Sara is a compelling character, and a powerful role model. Outwardly she is an ordinary 
child, albeit an extremely fortunate one, at least in the earlier part of the story. Inwardly - 
mentally and morally - however, she displays a strength that separates her from her peers. 
The force of the story comes when Sara's fortune changes after the death of her father and the 
loss of his fortune, which leaves her in the hands of the headmistress, who allows her to 
remain at the school only as a servant. Until that point the kindness, courtesy and generosity 
that she shows towards everyone around her are admirable, but do not require any great effort 
on her part. After that point, when she is treated badly by all but three loyal friends, to 
continue to behave in the same way is a moral triumph, and despite a few natural setbacks, 
Sara does triumph. Her constant mantra through her trial is this: 
'Whatever comes,' she said, 'cannot alter one thing.  If I am a princess in rags and 
tatters, I can be a princess inside.  It would be easy to be a princess if I were dressed 
in cloth of gold, but it is a great deal more of a triumph to be one all the time when no 
one knows it.'28 
 
Sara's behaviour - as part of the moral content in the story - serves as a moral example for the 
child reader, and because Sara is portrayed in a positive light throughout the story, this 
example is reinforced by the moral content of the story as well. 
Stories are also a powerful source of education about social values. The stories that a 
society tells its children are one of the most powerful ways of teaching a child about its 
values, and its social and legal structure. The way that a story portrays a character - as a hero 
or as a villain - or its events, in varying degrees of subtlety, directs the reader to make certain 
moral judgments about that characters or event. In a typical fairy tale, for example, hero and 
villain are distinguished not only by their actions, but by the outcome of the story. The hero is 
rewarded, the villain punished, and so the child reader learns the difference between good and 
bad action as well as the possible consequences of both. In this way the child learns to 
recognise those character traits and actions that a society values or disvalues. 
Stories are not the only way that children learn this however, and there are many 
different sources of these moral examples. This contribution is not therefore unique to 
literature. Furthermore, it is not my intention to argue in favour of any particular kind of 
moral content, and so my concern is not with any particular kind of moral example that forms 
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the moral content in a story. My interest is rather in the development of critical reasoning 
skills and moral responsiveness, and the moral content of stories will play an important role 
here. 
Critical Assessment 
 
The development of critical reasoning skills is one area of moral education for which an 
engagement with literature alone will not be sufficient. To be effective, it must be combined 
with instruction on the principles of critical reasoning. However, literature provides us with 
the opportunity to practice our critical reasoning skills, by giving us many different examples 
of characters and actions, as well as moral rules and systems, to assess. 
Literature creates fictional worlds into which the reader enters for the duration of the 
reading. The fictional world that a text creates can be as alike or as different to our world as 
the writer chooses to make it. It could be identical to the world that the reader knows it every 
aspect, with only the characters being an unknown, or it could be modelled on the world that 
the reader knows but with slight differences, or it could be all the way on the other end of the 
spectrum as a world completely different to the one that the reader knows. 
Fiction gives us experience of new worlds and societies, either actual societies of 
which we may have little or no knowledge, or imagined societies such as those portrayed in 
fantasy and science fiction stories. In addition to features such as geography, history and 
culture, these societies will have moral rules and systems, some of which will be similar to 
our own, and others completely different. Literature introduces us to alternate moral realities, 
and does in in a way that, say, philosophy cannot, by allowing us to 'live' in those realities for 
the duration of the story, and to experience their effects through the characters of the stories. 
Exposure to different moral systems (even fictional ones) makes us aware that there 
are alternatives to the moral system to which we are accustomed, and the progression of the 
stories is likely to create awareness that these systems have both good and bad points. As the 
story progresses, the characters will have to navigate the fictional world and in doing so will 
work either within its moral and legal systems, or against them, or in some cases a 
combination of the two. 
In Mark Twain's The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, for example, Huck is presented 
with a difficult moral choice. Believing that it is his duty to turn in the runaway slave, Jim, 
with whom he has been travelling, Huck writes a letter to Jim's owner, giving Jim's location. 
Having written the letter however, he finds himself unable to send it. He is aware of the 
social, legal and moral system of his society and knows what it requires of him with regards 
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to Jim. He even believes that he ought to conform to it, but his friendship with Jim presents 
him with a conflicting conception of what it would be right to do. His account of the moment 
states 
I … got to thinking over our trip down the river, and I see Jim before me, all the time, 
in the day and in the night time, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, and we a-
floating along, talking, and singing, and laughing.  But somehow I couldn't seem to 
strike no places to harden me against him, but only the other kind.  I'd see him 
standing my watch against his'n, stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping, and 
see him how glad he was when I come back out of the fog, and when I come to him 
again in the swamp, up there where the feud was - and suchlike times - and would 
always call me honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for me, and 
how good he always was, and at last I struck the time I saved him by telling the men 
we had smallpox aboard, and he was so grateful, and said I was the best friend old Jim 
ever had in the world, and the only one he's got now, and then I happened to look 
around, and see that paper.  
It was a close place.  I took it up, and held it in my hand.  I was a-trembling, 
because I'd got to decide, for ever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it.  I studied a 
minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself:  "All right, then, I'll go to 
hell" - and tore it up.29 
 
Huck's decision to help Jim, despite his belief that doing so will mean that he himself will be 
sent to hell, challenges the rightness of the moral beliefs of the society in which he lives, and 
the progression of the story supports and reinforces his choice. In other words, the moral 
content in the story consists of a conflict between two possible moral choices, but the moral 
content of the story portrays this conflict in such a way as to support only one of these 
choices. 
As I stated in Chapter One, the critical assessment of moral rules and systems can take 
two forms: first, the assessment of a moral system on its own terms, which involves the 
ability to recognise inconsistencies and to assess moral rules in terms of the central principles 
upon which the system is based, and second, the assessment of a moral system as a whole, in 
comparison with other systems and in terms of metaethical principles. Stories give us the 
opportunity to practice both of these skills. Each individual story gives us the opportunity to 
assess a particular moral system on its own terms, through engaging with the point of view of 
a character (or characters) living within that moral system. The progression of the story will 
usually require the character to make moral decisions, and the reader is often given insight 
into the reasoning that goes into making such decisions, as well as their consequences. In the 
example described above, the reader is given access to Huck's dilemma, as well as into the 
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reasoning that goes into his decision. The dilemma is the result of a conflict between the 
demands of the moral system he has been taught - which is rooted in a racist class system and 
a belief that to go against that system is immoral (will, in fact, result in the transgressor being 
sent to hell) - and the moral demands of the friendship that develops between he and Jim. 
Huck is developing his own moral system, of which friendship is a central moral ideal, and in 
this case, to obey the moral rules of his society would go against this ideal. 
An engagement with many different stories will mean exposure to many different 
moral systems and characters, which gives the reader the opportunity to compare them with 
each other, and with her own moral system. This practice will contribute to the development 
of our critical reasoning skills. Also, by assessing fictional moral realities and comparing 
them with one another we can learn to assess our own moral systems and actions, as well as 
those of the people we encounter in reality. 
 
Moral Responsiveness 
 
In the first section of this chapter I mentioned two separate roles that the imagination will 
play in the development and exercise of moral agency. First, one of the ways that we learn is 
through the imagination. Specifically, moral learning requires not only factual knowledge, 
but also knowledge of “how to act and how to feel”,30 and we acquire this through 
experiential imagining. Second, imagination will play an active role in moral agency, 
specifically in moral responsiveness. It is an essential component of empathy, as well as of 
choosing the right course of action in each set of circumstances. 
Imaginative engagement with fiction entails more than simply imagining that certain 
things are true in a fictional world. Ward Jones argues that a story invites us to take up an 
attitude towards the events, situations and people that it portrays, and it does this through the 
choices made by the author. These choices include the point of view from which the story is 
told, the atmosphere created around events or characters, and the kinds of emotions the story 
invites us to take towards its characters. In making these choices the author directs our 
attention towards the important or relevant features of what is portrayed, and so guides our 
reaction to the text. This is what makes up the moral content of the story. 
This reaction will be an emotional, as well as an intellectual, one. Attitudes are, 
among other things, affective states: to take up an attitude towards someone is to be  
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disposed to feel certain emotions towards [them], disposed to certain beliefs about 
[them], disposed to praise or blame [them] in certain circumstances, and disposed to 
act in certain ways towards [them].31 
 
In engaging with a story, therefore, the reader's imagination involves her emotional 
capacities. Doing so will develop her capacity for moral responsiveness: the ability to 
recognise and respond to the particulars of a situation, making use of our emotional responses 
and intuitions in order to act rightly. 
Moral responsiveness, like practical wisdom, is something that we learn by practising 
it. Given that our own experience is limited, especially in childhood, we can use stories to 
expand our experience of the world - as a platform for experiential imagining - and to give us 
an opportunity to practise our moral skills. 
Martha Nussbaum argues that the moral value of fiction lies in its ability to present 
the reader with a particular conception of the world, which embodies a moral point of view. 
She claims that  
life is never simply presented by a text; it is always represented as something.  This 
“as” can, and must, be seen not only in the paraphrasable content, but also in the style, 
which itself expresses choices and selections, and sets up, in the reader, certain 
activities and transactions rather than others.32 
 
Among the “activities and transactions” set up in a text will be emotional ones. The reader 
will be directed, through engagement with a fictional character, or with a narrator, to 
experience certain emotional reactions to events. In telling a story, an author not only 
constructs a series of events in a particular pattern, but also expresses a set of thoughts and 
judgments about the content of the story. In doing so the author presents “a perspective, a 
character, and a set of judgements which delimit each”.33 In reading a story we confront this 
perspective, and are able to “try that perspective on for size”.34  
A story therefore presents the reader not only with a representation of life but also 
with a moral perspective embodied in that representation. The story invites the reader to take 
up this perspective, and gives her the opportunity to assess it. Nussbaum argues that stories 
are particularly appropriate for what she calls the exercise of our moral capacities, because 
they are more open-ended than philosophical texts or ethical examples. Through engaging 
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with a story the reader learns “what it is to search for the appropriate description and why the 
search matters”.35 
In order to establish the importance of our engagement with stories for the 
development of moral agency, I need to answer two questions. First, do the kinds of 
emotional responses that we have to fictional characters or situations have any relevance to 
our experience of the real world? Second, given the importance of a capacity for empathy, are 
stories particularly suited to the development of this capacity? 
The first question is a concern about the object of our emotions. One possible 
objection to my position is that our emotional responses to fiction cannot have relevance to 
the real world simply because these emotions have as their object something that is not real 
(something that is imagined or fictional). It might seem that only emotions towards what is 
real could have any bearing on our emotions, or rather that we should not allow emotions 
with fictional or imagined objects to play any part in our decisions or actions. 
However, this implied contrast between what is fictional (imagined) and what is real 
is actually a mistaken one. By examining some of our common emotional responses, Richard 
Moran shows that there is no clear distinction between emotional responses to what is real 
and responses to what is imagined. It is in fact common for us to feel emotions about various 
counterfactuals; “things that might have happened to us but didn’t, things we might have 
done, how things might have turned out differently”,36 etc. All of these things are fictional, in 
the sense that they are not actually present in the here and now. Any emotions that we have 
towards them therefore have as their object something that does not exist in the real world. 
We also commonly have spontaneous empathetic reactions, such as wincing in sympathy 
when someone else gets hurt, even when there is no possibility of our being hurt. As such, 
Moran argues that most of our emotional attention does not concern objects that are actually 
present to us. It seems then that many of our emotional responses, even in real life, are 
responses to fictional or imagined states of events. 
The imagination therefore plays an active role in our everyday lives, and emotional 
responses to imagined situations will play a role in the decisions we make. If I imagine 
someone that I love being hurt by something that I do, for example, I will feel pain at the 
thought, and fear that what I imagine might actually come about. This pain and fear, despite 
being an emotional response to something that is only imagined, will influence my actions. I 
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make a connection between those negative emotions and the imagined state of affairs, and so 
I tend to avoid taking courses of action that might make what I have imagined into a reality. 
Stories create and reinforce these connections and tendencies. In engaging with a 
story we imagine events and respond emotionally to that imagining. In cases where we 
engage with a fictional character, part of that engagement will involve experiencing the 
emotional responses of that character. In the same way that I feel pain when I imagine a loved 
one in pain, I feel the pain of that character when he or she has a similar imagining, or 
perhaps at the event itself. This can help to create or reinforce the idea that actions likely to 
lead to that outcome should be avoided. 
Fiction presents the reader with new emotional possibilities, which brings me to my 
second question - whether stories are particularly suited to the development of a capacity for 
empathy - and partially answers it. Fiction is uniquely suitable for the development of 
empathy because of the emotional dimension of reading. Stories give us the opportunity for 
empathy, and make it easier for us to empathise with people than we might otherwise find it 
in real life. Stories give us a privileged access to the thoughts and emotions of fictional 
characters. We do not have this kind of access to real people, and children especially will 
require some extra information or guidance in order to empathise with others. Stories give us 
this extra inside information, and so provide us with the opportunity to exercise and develop 
our capacity for empathy. 
In Joanna Spyri's Heidi, the emotional crisis of the story comes when Heidi learns that 
she will not be allowed to leave Frankfurt, where she has been living as a companion to the 
invalid Clara Sesemann, to return home to her grandfather. The housekeeper, Fraulein 
Rottenmeier, who dislikes Heidi, catches her attempting to leave the house and makes it very 
clear that she is not allowed to leave. Afraid of hurting the Sesemann family, who have been 
very kind to her, Heidi is unable to explain how homesick she is. As a result, although they 
notice how thin and withdrawn she has become, the Sesemanns do not know the reason. The 
reader is given more insight: 
From the day Heidi had tried to go home and Fraulein Rottenmeier had scolded her 
for being so wicked and ungrateful, a change had come over the child.  She knew now 
that she could not go home whenever she liked, as Aunt Dete had told her, but that 
she had to stay in Frankfurt for a long time, maybe forever.  She also understood that 
Herr Sesemann would think her very ungrateful, and Clara and the grandmother, too, 
if she ever again showed signs of wanting to leave.  So there was nobody to whom she 
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could reveal how homesick she was for she could not face giving the grandmother, 
who was so kind to her, cause to be angry as Fraulein Rottenmeier had been.37 
 
The Sesemann family have no knowledge of the lie that Heidi's aunt, Dete, told her in order 
to convince her to leave the Swiss Alps for Frankfurt; that she would be allowed to return 
whenever she liked with gifts for her loved ones. Since Heidi has been made to believe that 
she will be thought ungrateful if she expresses a wish to leave, she keeps quiet, and the 
reason for the changes in her remains unknown until she becomes ill as a result of 
homesickness. The reader however, is given access to Heidi's thoughts and emotions, and so 
is able to empathise with her in a way that Clara, who knows nothing of Heidi's misery, 
cannot. 
In addition to this access to the thoughts and emotions of fictional characters, stories 
are also uniquely suited for the development of the emotional connections mentioned above. 
This is because of the techniques that are used in telling a story. Moran argues that our 
emotional responses to fiction are often strengthened by theatrical effects such as music or 
lighting in the case of film, or in the case of literature by descriptions. Although these effects 
generally detract from the realism of the situation that is being depicted, Moran claims that  
it would appear to be the very features of the work that do indeed detract from the 
realistic presentation of the fictional world that actually enhance, and don't inhibit, the 
intensity and richness of one's emotional involvement with it.38 
 
In this passage from Laura Ingalls Wilder's Little Town on the Prairie, for example, Laura's 
description of a revival meeting at the church makes use of theatrical effects to emphasise her 
reaction to the situation: 
Chills ran up Laura's spine and over her scalp. She seemed to feel something rising 
from all those people, something dark and frightening that grew and grew under that 
thrashing voice. The words no longer made sense, they were not sentences, they were 
only dreadful words. For one horrible instant Laura imagined that Reverend Brown 
was the Devil. His eyes had fires in them … She looked at Pa and Ma. They were 
quietly standing and quietly singing, while the dark, wild thing that she had felt was 
roaring all around them like a blizzard.39 
 
The use of this imagery of blizzards and the devil draws on the imaginative associations that 
Laura makes, and invites the reader to make use of those same associations to enhance the 
experience of engaging with the text. Moran defines imagination as having  
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less to do with simply imagining something to be the case, or imagining doing or 
feeling something, and more to do with what we ordinarily think of as 
“imaginativeness”.  This concerns the ability to make connections between various 
things, to notice and respond to the network of associations that make up the mood or 
emotional tone of a work.40 
 
Fiction draws on this “network of associations” in order to create emotional responses in the 
reader, but it also plays a role in creating the network itself, by creating the connections 
between events and emotions that I described above. This imaginativeness will play an 
important role in experiential imagining, and therefore in moral responsiveness as well. 
 
Concerns about Negative Effects of Literature 
 
Thus far I have focused on the positive contribution that literature could make towards moral 
development, but it is by no means certain that the effects of literature will always be 
positive. An encounter with the wrong kind of literature, as with the wrong kind of person, 
could have a negative rather than a positive effect.  
I stated earlier that I do not intend to focus on the development of any particular kind 
of moral content. This point requires some further explanation. Lynne Tirrell makes a 
distinction between two moral functions of literature. The first of these is based in the moral 
content of a story - an author depicts a moral view of the world and by engaging with the 
story the reader learns to recognise certain events, characters and actions as good or bad. This 
recognition will contribute to the development of moral content. The second function 
involves engaging with the practice of storytelling as a means of developing moral 
responsiveness. Both Tirrell and Nussbaum argue that this function is the more important of 
the two and, consequently, that engaging with fiction can have a positive effect on the reader 
regardless of the content of the story, because in doing so the reader is developing as a moral 
agent. If this is the case then 
a morally corrupt narrator may make as positive a contribution to a reader’s 
subsequent standing as a moral agent as may a morally good narrator.41 
 
This is because if the reader recognises the narrator - or the moral content of the story - as 
morally corrupt, and so rejects the invitation to engage with that point of view, the reader 
reinforces her own moral content, exercising her moral capacities in doing so. 
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While I do not disagree with this view, there are still some considerations that we 
need to take into account. The likely effect of a story will depend on the character of the 
reader. An adult reader who is already a fully developed moral agent with a strongly 
supported moral system on which to base her reaction to the story may be unaffected, or only 
affected in a positive way, by a morally corrupt narrator or perspective. A child reader on the 
other hand, who is still in the process of developing as a moral agent, may well be affected in 
a negative way by the same story. In order to identify a narrator as morally corrupt a reader 
must already have moral content that she fully understands and can therefore justify. A child 
who does not yet have this kind of moral content in place might not recognise moral 
corruption, and engaging with the story could result in her forming moral content that mirrors 
either that of the narrator (the moral content of the story) or one of the characters (the moral 
content in the story). 
My focus in this project is on the development of moral skills, rather than on moral 
content, but this does not mean that the content of moral education is unimportant. On the 
contrary, the ability to renegotiate moral rules is logically dependent on there being an 
existing set of rules to negotiate. A child is not yet a fully developed moral agent, and is 
therefore often relying on content learned through imitation without a full understanding of 
the reasons for the rules. Concerns about the content of fiction are therefore still appropriate 
with regard to child readers. 
There are two ways of viewing the moral content of a story. One way is to look at the 
moral content in the story and question whether it is something to which children should be 
exposed. Stories depicting violence or containing explicit sexual content, for example, are 
usually considered inappropriate for children, regardless of the attitude that the story invites 
us to take up towards these acts. The reasoning behind this is that children are simply not 
mature enough to deal with exposure to certain things. This concern is connected to age and 
levels of understanding, but it can have a moral dimension to it as well. This moral dimension 
is connected to the second way of viewing the moral content of a story, which involves 
looking at the story in terms of the moral perspective that the story presents, or the attitudes 
towards its events that it invites the reader to take up (the moral content of the story). Stories 
that depict violence as acceptable behaviour, for example, could easily result in a child reader 
forming a similar point of view, particularly in the absence of contradictory examples. The 
concern here is not that the child is exposed to violence, but that the child is exposed to 
violence in such a way as to make it seem acceptable, or even desirable. 
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If it is the case that all our engagements with fiction strengthen our moral capacities 
and will therefore always have a positive effect, then only a lack of engagement - a failure to 
exercise our moral capacities - could have a negative effect. However, this position is based 
on a conception of imaginative engagement with fiction as a conscious and deliberate 
process. If this view is correct, then if the intentions of the reader are good then the outcome 
of the engagement will also be good. In other words, a virtuous reader will not take up the 
invitation to engage with a non-virtuous character, but will resist the invitation, thereby 
preventing herself from taking on any perspectives that might have a negative effect on her 
morality.42 In this way, even a morally corrupt character or narrator will have a positive effect 
of the morality of the reader, because in refusing to engage with such a character, the reader 
exercises and strengthens her moral capacities. 
There are two problems with this view. First, this kind of view presupposes that the 
reader is already a fully developed moral agent, capable of both recognising and rejecting an 
invitation to engage with a morally corrupt point of view. Second, as James Harold argues, 
our responses to fiction might not be as much in our control as the above view suggests. In 
most cases, he claims, imaginative engagement with a fictional character or point of view is 
not a deliberate decision on the part of the reader, but is instead a natural and unconscious 
response to the text itself. 
Murray Smith argues that there are three different levels of imaginative engagement 
with fictional characters: recognition, alignment and allegiance. The most basic level is the 
recognition of the character, which functions in the same way as recognition of a real person 
would, and is therefore not unique to fiction. Alignment is a kind of tracking of a fictional 
character, taking on his point of view. This will include engaging with his emotional 
responses and his attitudes to the people and situations that he encounters in the story. 
Alignment is a necessary component of engaging with fiction; it is what allows the reader to 
enter into the story. Allegiance involves an evaluation of a fictional character based on the 
values that the character embodies, and subsequently the formation of “more-or-less 
sympathetic or antipathetic allegiances”43 with the character. 
If it were possible for the reader to align herself with a character without forming an 
allegiance either for or against him, then this separation of the two kinds of engagement could 
serve as a kind of moral safeguard for the reader, allowing her to engage with fictional 
characters without being negatively affected by this engagement. Harold however, argues that 
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the distinction between alignment and allegiance is not so clean cut. The process of alignment 
with a fictional character is an automatic response to the presentation of that character's point 
of view. As such, this alignment is largely determined by the fiction itself, and not by any 
conscious effort on the part of the reader. The more time that the text gives to the point of 
view of a character, the easier and stronger the alignment will be. This alignment will also be 
quicker and easier when the emotional states and values of the character correspond with 
those of the reader. It is far easier to engage with a character if we have something in 
common with him. Even similarities that have no connection to the moral attitudes of the 
character - perhaps a similarity in musical tastes or sense of humour - could make alignment 
easier, and might make it easier to align ourselves with other aspects of that character, 
including emotions and attitudes. From there, it is a fairly easy step to forming a positive 
allegiance with that character, which involves something more like an endorsement of the 
attitudes and values of that character.44 Negative allegiance - an antipathy - towards a 
character is similarly easy to form when the character or point of view that the reader is 
required to align herself with is completely dissimilar to the reader herself or one that the 
reader finds repugnant in one way or another. Either way, having spent so much time in 
alignment with a character, it is a very easy step from there to allegiance, especially if the 
moral content of the story encourages this allegiance. 
Another factor that contributes to the blurring of the distinction between the two is 
that our engagement with fiction is “affectively charged”.45 When we engage with a fictional 
character this engagement occurs on an emotional as well as an intellectual level, and so any 
thoughts about moral issues that might result from the engagement will take the form of an 
emotional reaction towards the character or events in the story. Harold argues that these 
affectively charged thoughts are more likely to remain with us and therefore to influence our 
morality than neutral thoughts. It may be that the only influence that results is that the reader 
is likely to align more easily with a similar character in another fiction, but the cumulative 
effects of these influences could quite conceivably lead to a change in the reader's behaviour. 
It is possible that this automatic response could affect and change our moral consciousness in 
ways that are impossible to detect at first. Alignment may lead to allegiance, especially over 
long periods of time and repeated engagement with similar stories and characters, and the 
shift may be so subtle that we are not aware that it is happening. 
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As an example, consider C.S. Lewis's The Voyage of the Dawn Treader. One of the 
chief personality conflicts in the book is between Reepicheep, a one-foot-tall talking Mouse 
and Knight of Narnia, and the unfortunately named Eustace Scrubb, a newcomer to Narnia 
and a supremely unpleasant person. A magical painting has drawn Eustace into the world of 
Narnia, along with his cousins Lucy and Edmund, who have visited Narnia before. They find 
themselves on board a ship captained by King Caspian of Narnia, an old friend of Lucy and 
Edmund. Eustace is an irritating, spoiled, selfish, cowardly little idiot, who spend all of his 
time complaining about, and to, his companions, and who foolishly provokes the Mouse by 
making fun of him. Reepicheep, on the other hand, is chivalry personified, and highly 
regarded by everyone except Eustace. The two characters are set up in opposition to each 
other by the narrator, with an obvious bias in favour of Reepicheep. 
The narrator gives the reader access to Eustace's point of view during the early days 
of his time in Narnia, through extracts from his diary. Since this point of view is extremely 
objectionable, the only allegiance that could possibly come out of this alignment with Eustace 
is a negative one, and by extension, a positive one with Reepicheep. This would not be a 
problem if it were not for the fact that, mixed in with the rest of Eustace's complaints and 
wrong-headed ideas can be found brief mentions of two things - the feminist idea that girls 
are not weaker than boys and should not be treated differently, and the pacifist belief that 
fighting for the sake of fighting should be avoided. Among the complaints in Eustace's diary 
is this one, referring to the fact that King Caspian has given up his own cabin to Lucy, 
proposing that he, Edmund and Eustace should sleep in the ship's main cabin with the rest of 
the crew: 
Needless to say I've been put in the worst cabin of the boat, a perfect dungeon, and 
Lucy has been given a whole room on deck to herself, almost a nice room compared 
with the rest of this place.  [Caspian] says that's because she's a girl.  I tried to make 
him see what [mother] says, that all that sort of thing is really lowering girls but he 
was too dense.46 
 
And later, after Eustace has offended Reepicheep, the following confrontation occurs: 
'Why do you not draw your own sword, poltroon!' cheeped the Mouse. 'Draw and 
fight or I'll beat you black and blue with the flat.' 
'I haven't got one,' said Eustace.  'I'm a pacifist.  I don't believe in fighting.'47 
 
Admittedly, the mention of both issues is extremely brief, and is not revisited directly in the 
book. Also, given that Lewis wrote the story during WWII, the attitude towards women as 
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well as the implied connection between pacifism and cowardice is understandable. That, 
however, is a matter for the literary biographers, and does not allay my concerns. Lewis's 
books are still being read today, usually by children who are unlikely to have knowledge of 
the historical context behind Lewis's attitudes. The child reader will see only what is 
presented in the text - the moral content in the story (Eustace's stated belief in feminism and 
pacifism) and the moral content of the story (the attitude that the narrator invites us to take up 
towards those beliefs) - and unfortunately what is presented includes at least two arguably 
admirable ideas labelled as foolish, or worse, cowardly, simply because they are presented by 
a character whom the reader is set up to dislike intensely. Reepicheep, on the other hand, is 
portrayed only in a favourable light, which portrayal is only strengthened by comparison with 
Eustace. In fact, Reepicheep is not as attractive a character as Lewis obviously intended him 
to be. He is overly concerned with his honour, quick to take offence, and entirely too keen on 
rushing into every fight that presents itself, dragging his companions with him, often against 
their better judgment. The negative allegiance with Eustace however, has its natural 
counterpart in a positive one with Reepicheep, making it likely that the reader will value what 
he values because of that allegiance, which is reinforced by the moral content of the story. 
 
Selecting Books for Children 
 
Fiction can have an effect on children, both positive and negative. These effects can occur 
both through the presentation of moral examples in fiction, and through our imaginative 
engagement with fiction. We need to bear both of these possibilities in mind when selecting 
books for child to read. A simple solution would be to limit our selection to only those stories 
that provide moral examples (the content in a story) and perspectives (the content of a story) 
of which we approve. This solution however, seems to run counter to the aims of moral 
education. To limit our selection of books in this way means that we limit the child reader to 
a certain moral perspective, which could prevent her from developing the moral skills 
necessary for full moral agency, namely the ability to critically assess moral rules and 
systems, and moral responsiveness (which includes empathy). 
In the case of the example above, if we disapprove of the attitudes towards women 
and fighting that are expressed in the story, a simple solution would be to prevent children 
from reading C.S. Lewis's stories, and provide them instead only with stories that endorse 
feminism and disapprove of fighting. Not only would this be almost impossible to do 
however, it runs counter to the aims of moral education. It is not enough to simply prevent 
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children from encountering, say, stories that promote violence as a means of solving every 
problem. The aim of moral education is to teach children the skills necessary in order for 
them to recognise, for themselves, that violence is undesirable. Of course, we take the risk 
that the child will reach the opposite conclusion, but I think that this risk is worth taking for 
the sake of moral development. 
While it may be possible to develop these skills from even a limited exposure to 
moral perspectives through fiction, it seems plausible that the wider the selection of stories 
and perspectives, the more likely it is that the reader will develop more fully as a moral agent. 
In the case of critical assessment, one of the main contributions that literature can make is to 
expose us to moral differences between ourselves and others. Encountering many different 
moral perspectives gives us the means - if not the skills - to compare them either with each 
other or with our own. In the case of empathy, what is required is practice. To empathise 
implies taking on a perspective that is not our own, and since the aim here is to develop moral 
agency, what is needed is an encounter with moral perspectives that differ from our own; or 
in the case of the child reader who does not yet have a fully developed moral perspective, 
encounters with many different moral perspectives. 
This idea seems very similar to Tirrell's view that even an encounter with a morally 
corrupt narrator could have a positive effect on moral development, because it will require 
the reader to exercise her moral capacities (in rejecting the invitation to engage with that 
perspective). However, as I have discussed above, there is still a need to take the moral 
content of a story - the attitude that it invites the reader to take up towards the events, 
characters and actions that it portrays - into account when selecting books for children. This 
leaves us with something of a paradox. In choosing books for children to read we need to 
protect them from literature that could have a negative moral effect until such time as they 
become fully developed moral agents, who are more capable of protecting themselves from 
any negative effects of what they read. However, part of the process of developing moral 
agency requires that we engage with moral perspectives that differ from our own, and which 
could have an effect, either positive or negative, on our morality. 
 
A Possible Solution 
 
An alternative to the simple solution of limiting our selection of books to those that contain 
moral examples and perspectives of which we approve, lies in teaching children to approach 
literature in a particular way. Rather than focusing on the kinds of stories that we give 
children to read, we need to focus on the way in which children approach stories. In Chapter 
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Three I will offer an account of a particular way of reading that I think will provide children 
with some protection against the possible negative effects of fiction, while still allowing them 
to benefit from the exposure to alternate moral perspectives.  
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Chapter Three: Two Ways of Reading 
 
In Chapter Two I argued that we cannot simply accept the claim that our imaginative 
engagement with literature can have only a positive effect on the morality of the child reader. 
The effects of an engagement with a fictional character or narrator could as easily be negative 
as positive, especially in the case of the child reader who does not yet have the strongly 
supported amalgam of moral content that is required in order to recognise a morally corrupt 
character, and to refuse the invitation to align with that character. Through aligning with such 
a character and becoming, in the process, familiar with and possibly comfortable with, the 
moral attitudes and actions of that character, the child reader could come to view such actions 
as morally acceptable, even morally desirable. At the same time however, I argued that we 
ought not to limit our selection of books to those that provide only moral examples and 
attitudes of which we approve. This is because doing so limits the child reader to 
engagements with a particular moral perspective, which could hinder her development as a 
moral agent. In particular, I argued that the development of empathy will require an exposure 
to many different moral perspectives, and that this exposure to difference is one of the main 
contributions that literature can make to moral development. 
 There are two concerns to be answered here. The first is that the child reader will be 
influenced in a negative way by the moral content in the story, because she fails to 
understand that the moral content of the story portrays that content as morally bad. The 
second is that the moral content of the story could be morally bad, in which case 
understanding it will not prevent the child from being negatively affected. In order to answer 
the first concern I will argue that we need to teach children to approach stories in such a way 
as to enable them to develop the moral skills necessary for moral agency, while still 
providing some protection from harmful influences. Moral education will therefore involve 
teaching children to read in a particular way. I will argue in favour of what I will call 
disinterested immersed reading and make two claims about the benefits of this kind of 
reading: first, that it will enable the development of both critical reasoning skills and moral 
responsiveness, and second, that it will provide some protection from negative influences. 
This solution will provide an answer to the first concern mentioned above. I will deal with the 
second concern in Chapter Four. 
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Two Ways of Reading 
 
J.H. Miller makes a distinction between two ways of reading. The first is “an innocent, 
childlike abandonment to the act of reading, without suspicion, reservation or interrogation”. 
The reader makes a “willing suspension of disbelief” to such an extent that she is completely 
drawn into the story, at which point the suspension becomes “spontaneous, without 
forethought”.48 What this means is that the reader accepts as real or true (for the duration of 
the story) the content - including the moral content - that is portrayed in the story. In this 
chapter I will refer to this kind of reading as immersed reading. The second is a sophisticated, 
suspicious way of reading that pays attention not just to what the story is about but how it is 
told and through which literary devices the telling is made effective. In this chapter I will 
refer to this kind of reading as critical reading. 
In most cases, when we read for pleasure it is immersed reading that is our goal. This 
kind of reading is also referred to as “ludic reading” or “reading trance”, which brings about a 
change in the consciousness of the reader.49 This change in consciousness means that the 
reader is completely absorbed in the story, to the extent that she is only partially aware of the 
words printed on the page. Her eyes take in the words almost without her noticing them, and 
transform them into something else - the world of the story. For the duration of the reading 
the reader is, while still peripherally aware of her surroundings, effectively in another world, 
conscious of happenings not visible to anyone else. 
Miller describes works of fiction as virtual realities or worlds into which the reader 
enters as an observer for the duration of the reading. It is this quality of fiction - that it gives 
us access to realities other than our own - that makes it so appealing. As a general rule, when 
ludic reading is our goal, we count as successful those works of fiction that enable us to enter 
into this virtual reality to such an extent that for a time we lose track or our own world and 
experience the fictional world of the story. For the duration of the reading we 'forget' that this 
virtual reality is fictional and experience it as if it were real. Of course, there are works of 
fiction that deliberately draw attention to their own fictionality, which would prevent the 
reader from suspending disbelief in this manner. This does not mean that such works cannot 
be successful, only that if they succeed it is in achieving a different goal to the creation of the 
kind of virtual reality described above.   
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In the case of the child reader in particular, the goal of reading for pleasure is to 
experience this kind of reading trance. Children naturally read in a childlike way, and most, if 
not all, of the pleasure of reading comes from the experience of the story, and not from 
literary criticism of the story. As a general rule however, the greater part of literary education 
in schools - once children are able to read independently - focuses on teaching at least the 
beginnings of literary criticism. In what follows, I will argue that, while still valuable for 
other purposes, this focus on literary analysis and criticism means that the contribution that 
literature could make to moral development is ignored, or even thwarted, and that a new 
approach is needed. 
These two ways of reading, the immersed and the critical, go counter to each other, 
and cannot exist simultaneously in a single reading of a text. In considering a literary device 
and understanding the effect that it creates, the reader is not at that moment susceptible to that 
effect. While the reader is paying attention to the text itself - to the words on the page - her 
focus shifts, and she is no longer immersed in the story. 
The critical reading is the one common to literary criticism, as well as much of 
literary philosophy. One of the main reasons to read in the critical manner is a kind of 
scientific or linguistic curiousity, a desire to find out how literature works and understand 
why it has the effect that it does. Another reason for reading critically is what Miller 
describes as "apotropaic", meaning having the power to prevent evil. He argues that 
people have a healthy fear of the power literary works have to instil what may be 
dangerous or unjust assumptions about race, gender or class. Both cultural studies and 
rhetorical reading, the latter especially in its deconstructive mode, have this hygienic 
or defensive purpose.50 
 
It is this quality of critical reading, that it makes it impossible (in any one act of reading) for 
us to be drawn into the story as we would be in an immersed reading, that makes it 
apotropaic. When we are focused on how a particular effect is created, that effect cannot 
work on us as it would were we unaware of it. When the effect in question is to influence our 
responses to something, in becoming aware that we are being influenced we are placed in a 
position that allows us to either acquiesce or to refuse to respond in that way. A critical 
reading offers protection from the content of the story; from the attitude that it invites the 
reader to take towards what it portrays. In cases where literary works contain “dangerous or 
unjust assumptions” that the immersed, innocent way of reading will not necessarily question, 
a critical reading of the text might prevent these assumptions from taking hold in the mind of 
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the reader. Reading in this way however, will also prevent the reader from learning from 
(through engaging with and experiencing) the moral content of the story, which is what 
teaches the child reader how to evaluate the moral content in the story. 
 
The Ideal Reader 
 
This brings us back to the question of what kind of reader we should teach children to be. 
There are two ways to conceive of the ideal reader. On one conception, the ideal reader is the 
sophisticated, educated adult reader, who is capable of recognising literary devices and 
therefore able to resist being completely 'taken in' by the moral content of the story. On 
another, the ideal reader is the naïve, childlike reader, who willingly suspends disbelief and 
enters completely into the world of the story. This suspension of disbelief extends to both the 
content in the story (the reader suspends disbelief in the events and characters in the story) 
and the content of the story (the reader accepts the invitation to engage with a particular 
perspective or attitude towards those events and characters). 
Like Miller, Wayne Booth defines the ideal reader in terms of protection against the 
possible harm that a fiction could do. A reader who is unable to read “properly” could be 
negatively affected by a story because she is unable to place ideas and images in context, 
resulting in an effect that comes from the story as it is read, which is not the same thing as the 
intentions of the author, or the meaning of the work as a whole, fully understood.51 One way 
to prevent this harm is to perform a “full” reading of the text, or a critical reading. He argues 
that the reader who can do this is the ideal reader, able to discern how the text creates the 
fictional world and thus avoid any potential harmful effects. Most readers however, will not 
be ideal readers in this sense. Children, especially, will not be capable of this kind of critical 
reading. Nor, I think, should we encourage them to become only this kind of reader. 
Each of these kinds of reading will benefit the reader in different ways. A critical 
reading could serve as safeguard against possible negative effects. An immersed reading will, 
if nothing else, give the reader the enjoyment that is one of the primary functions of literature, 
and which is only possible through imaginative engagement with the story - the willing 
suspension of disbelief. This enjoyment is valuable from a moral point of view simply 
because it will create and nurture the desire for more such experiences. An unfortunate effect 
of the kind of critical reading taught in schools is the curtailment of this enjoyment in many 
children, often resulting in an indifference to, if not a dislike of, reading. The moral benefits 
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of immersed reading however, go beyond simple enjoyment. Among other things, a 
disinterested immersed reading will provide some protection from the moral content in the 
story. In what follows I will outline an alternative account that defines the ideal reader as one 
who reads in such a way as to take full advantage of the contribution that literature can make 
to moral development - namely, a reader who immerses herself in the story. I will focus first 
on the contribution that this kind of reading can make to the development of moral skills - 
specifically moral responsiveness - and second, on the way in which it can provide a measure 
of protection against negative effects (from the moral content in the story). 
 
The Development of Moral Responsiveness 
 
In this section I will make two claims. First, that in order to fully understand a story we have 
to engage with it as fully as possible, and this will necessarily involve an emotional response 
to it. A full understanding of a text therefore requires an immersed reading, rather than a 
critical one. Second, because immersed reading necessarily involves emotion, it is well suited 
for the development of empathy (unlike critical reading, which distances the reader from the 
emotional import of the story). 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, imaginative engagement with a story entails more 
than simply imagining that certain fictional states of affairs are true. Engaging with a fictional 
world entails taking up certain attitudes towards it52 - whether these attitudes are directly 
prescribed by the text or simply result from our engagement with it - and these attitudes 
involve a tendency to feel certain emotions towards the circumstances, events and characters 
that the story portrays. 
David Novitz takes this idea a step further, claiming that a proper reading of a text 
requires the kind of imaginative engagement that includes and elicits emotional responses to 
fictional characters and events. Jenefer Robinson makes a similar claim, arguing that it is our 
emotional responses to stories that help us “to understand characters and grasp the 
significance of events in the plot”.53 This kind of reading - immersed reading - is essential to 
a full understanding of a text, and is in fact a prior condition for a critical reading, which in 
Robinson's view amounts to a “a reflection upon one’s emotional experience of the work”.54 
Contrary to Booth’s conception of the ideal reader as one who will read critically, paying 
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attention to the manner in which the story is told, and so avoid being unduly influenced by it, 
Novitz argues that 
far from an emotional response to fiction precluding a proper understanding of it, one 
can only properly understand fiction if one is in a position to be appropriately moved 
by the fortunes or misfortunes of its characters. A condition of being appropriately 
moved by, and so understanding, fiction is that one should respond imaginatively to 
it.55 
 
In order to properly understand a work of fiction therefore, the reader must imagine along 
with the author.  She must “make-believe by thinking [her] way into the author’s imaginary 
world”56. Once the reader has done this, she will be able to respond to fictional characters - 
both intellectually and emotionally - as if they were real people. This claim, that a proper 
understanding of fiction requires imaginative engagement, gives us a new picture of the ideal 
reader. Reading properly in this sense no longer means a critical reading, but an immersed 
reading. This does not mean that a reader cannot gain additional knowledge of a text by 
reading critically, but only that a critical reading alone will not be enough for a full 
understanding of a text. 
This brings me to my second claim, that because immersed reading necessarily 
involves an emotional engagement with a story, it is better suited for the development of a 
capacity for empathy than a critical reading would be. Immersed reading - or the reading 
trance - involves a temporary 'forgetting' of the real world, and by extension, ourselves. This 
'forgetting' of ourselves means that we, as readers, are better able to empathise with 
characters in the fictional world. By setting aside, as far as possible, our own concerns and 
thoughts about ourselves and the real world, and taking on the perspective of a fictional 
character or narrator, we practise the moral skills that are involved in empathising with other 
people in the real world. Stories give us the opportunity for empathy, and make it easier for 
us to take up that opportunity by providing us with access to the experience - the thoughts 
and emotions - of a fictional character. An immersed reading allows us to take full advantage 
of what the story offers.  
I would like to return here to Robinson's claim that an emotional engagement with a 
story - an immersed reading - is prior to, and necessary for, a critical reading of a text. This 
implies, I think correctly, that a full critical reading of a text can only take place after an 
initial, immersed reading. If this is the case, then my concern that a focus on critical reading 
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will limit the moral benefits of reading seems unfounded, since the reader would already have 
gained these moral benefits from the initial immersed reading, leaving her free to pursue 
additional understanding through literary criticism. However, the distinction between a child 
reader and an adult reader is crucial here. The sophisticated critical reader that Miller 
describes is the adult reader, with not only the necessary knowledge and skill to perform a 
critical reading, but also presumably enough of an interest in stories to take the time for a 
second, critical reading. More importantly for my purposes, the adult reader will already be a 
more or less fully developed moral agent. The case of the child reader is different, as she is 
still in the process of developing as a moral agent. An exclusive focus on critical reading - in 
the classroom, for example, where children are generally required to make their first reading 
of a text a critical one - will come at the cost of immersed reading, and by extension, at the 
cost of the benefits of immersed reading, among them not only an enjoyment of reading, but 
also the development of the child's moral capacities. 
As an example, consider the following passage from Francis Hodgson Burnett's A 
Little Princess: 
The first night she spent in her attic was a thing Sara never forgot. During its passing, 
she lived through a wild, unchildlike woe of which she never spoke to anyone about 
her. There was no one who would have understood. It was, indeed, well for her that as 
she lay awake in the darkness her mind was forcibly distracted, now and then, by the 
strangeness of her surroundings. It was, perhaps, well for her that she was reminded 
by her small body of material things. If this had not been so, the anguish of her young 
mind might have been too great for a child to bear. But, really, while the night was 
passing she scarcely knew that she had a body at all, or remembered any other thing 
than one. 
'My papa is dead!' she kept whispering to herself. 'My papa is dead!' 
It was not until long afterward that she realised that her bed had been so hard 
that she turned over and over in it to find a place to rest, that the darkness seemed 
more intense than any she had ever known, and that the wind howled over the roof 
among the chimneys like something which wailed aloud. Then there was something 
worse. This was certain scufflings and scratches and sqeakings in the walls and 
behind the skirting boards. She knew what they meant, because Becky had described 
them. They meant rats and mice who were either fighting with each other or playing 
together. Once or twice she even heard sharp-toed feet scurrying across the floor, and 
she remembered in those after days, when she recalled things, that when first she 
heard them she started up in bed and sat trembling, and when she lay down again 
covered her head with the bedclothes. 
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The change in her life did not come about gradually, but was made all at 
once.57 
A typical classroom scenario for this passage would be a lesson on imagery. The darkness of 
the attic, which “seemed more intense than any she had ever known”, mirrors this extremely 
dark time in Sara's life, the first night she spends with the knowledge of her father's death. 
The wind, which “howled over the roof among the chimneys like something which wailed 
aloud”, might represent the tears that Sara herself does not shed. As a means of illustrating 
how such imagery works this would be an effective lesson, but it does nothing to further an 
understanding of the story. In order to get the full impact of Sara's emotional state in this 
passage we have to engage with it - to feel it - rather than pull it apart. To understand the 
horrifying sadness of this part of the story does not require a literary analysis, but rather an 
emotional engagement with it - an immersed reading. Further, the kind of understanding that 
come from an immersed reading is an emotional understanding. Through engaging with this 
passage the reader comes to empathise with Sara - to feel along with her the terrible sadness 
and emptiness of her loss. 
I do not want to argue that knowledge of literary techniques is not valuable. My 
concern is that an exclusive focus on the teaching of literary criticism moves the child reader 
away from the kind of reading that will be of the most benefit in terms of moral development. 
Literary criticism teaches children about stories and storytelling, but in doing so often gets in 
the way of the skills that children could learn from stories. If moral education is our aim, then 
we need to encourage children to immerse themselves in stories - to learn from them, rather 
than just about them.  
 
Protection from Negative Effects: Critical Assessment 
 
If we accept that immersed reading and critical reading are mutually exclusive, at least in a 
single reading of a text, then the concept of the ideal reader as one who immerses herself in a 
story does nothing to answer concerns about the possible negative effects of an imaginative 
engagement with fiction. On Miller's conception, it is the critical reading of a text that is 
apotropaic, and so protection from possible negative effect would require that the reader pay 
attention to the literary devices that are used in the text, which in turn would prevent 
immersed reading. In order to protect the child reader from negative effects of the moral 
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content of stories therefore, it still seems like our only option is to teach the child to read 
critically right from the start. 
 In this section I will offer an alternative solution. Rather than abandoning immersed 
reading, what is needed is the addition of a new component to my account of the ideal reader. 
Miller's distinction between immersed reading (which he refers to as a naïve reading) and 
critical reading (meaning literary criticism) implies that the immersed or naïve reading is 
uncritical. In other words, that an immersed reading will mean that the reader uncritically 
accepts the moral content in the story. I think that this need not be the case. Immersed reading 
need not be uncritical, but the kind of criticism I have in mind is not literary criticism but 
ethical criticism. By ethical criticism I do not mean that we should evaluate stories in terms 
of our own moral codes, but rather that we should evaluate them in terms of their own. In 
doing so, the reader is open to learning from the moral content of stories, but protected from 
the effects of the moral content in stories. This kind of ethical criticism be compatible with an 
immersed reading. 
 In what follows I will develop an account of a specific kind of immersed reading; a 
distinterested immersed reading. It is this quality of disinterestedness that will provide some 
measure of protection against negative influences. It is important to note however, that this 
protection will not be a total protection against every possible negative influence, but only a 
partial one. This kind of reading will not prevent the child reader from being affected and 
influenced by the moral perspectives that she encounters in the story. What it will do is 
prevent her from taking these perspectives - and any moral claims or rules they endorse - out 
of context. I will discuss this in more detail later on. 
Thus far I have argued that the ideal reader must immerse herself in the story, 
engaging with it on an emotional as well as an intellectual level. Now I add a second 
component. The ideal reader must be capable of evaluating the moral reality of the story on 
its own terms. This second component will be beneficial to moral development not only in 
terms of protection, but also because it will require - and so provide the child reader with the 
opportunity to exercise and develop - the critical reasoning skills are crucial to moral agency. 
 In Chapter One I argued that the ability to assess a moral system on its own terms, as 
well as in comparison with other moral systems, is an essential component of moral agency, 
and in Chapter Two I argued that literature gives us the opportunity to exercise and develop 
this ability. Each story that we read presents us with a fictional world, complete with 
characters with different moral commitments, and with a fictional moral system (a set of 
moral rules or patterns of behaviour that are considered acceptable or right in that particular 
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fictional world). This makes up the content in the story. Assessing this moral system in 
comparison with others will not be possible in an immersed reading, since that would require 
the reader to step out of the fictional world. To assess it on its own terms however, is 
compatible with immersed reading, and will be a necessary part of the kind of immersed 
reading that I am advocating.  
In order to show why this kind of assessment is important for immersed reading, and 
for moral development, I will distinguish between two kinds of immersed reading. In An 
Experiment in Criticism, C.S. Lewis discusses the value of different kinds of imagination. He 
begins by giving a series of definitions to clear up the confusion that is common in discussing 
the terms 'imagination' and 'fantasy'. The term 'fantasy' has both literary and psychological 
meanings. As a literary term, the word fantasy denotes any story that deals with “impossibles 
and preternaturals”.58 In other words, fantasy stories deal with things such as magic, or 
occurrences that cannot be explained in terms of science and logic. This is not the sense of 
the word that is relevant here. 
As a psychological term 'fantasy' has two meanings: first, a delusion, meaning an 
imaginative construction that is mistaken for reality; second, it is a daydream, meaning “a 
pleasing imaginative construction”59 that is entertained without the delusion that it is reality. 
In some cases, Lewis argues, daydreaming can be harmful to the dreamer. If a daydream is 
entertained constantly, reality may become unsatisfactory, and the dreamer may indulge to 
such an extent that she becomes unable or unwilling to take the effort needed to achieve 
happiness outside of the daydream. In most cases however, daydreaming is “indulged in 
moderately and briefly as a temporary holiday or recreation, duly subordinated to more 
effective and outgoing activities”.60 This activity, which Lewis terms “castle-building”61 is 
common to all of us, and need not be harmful. In some cases it becomes productive, resulting 
in artistic endeavours that mirror the world of the daydream. 
This castle-building can be further divided into two kinds of activity: the egoistic and 
the disinterested.62 In the egoistic daydream, it is the dreamer herself who is the centre of the 
dream; she is the heroine and everything is seen through her eyes. In the disinterested 
daydream, the dreamer is not the heroine or even the focus of the dream, and may not be 
present at all. This can be taken a step further, to the creation of whole worlds and people in 
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them. At this point the creation becomes more than just a daydream; it becomes a 
“construction, invention … [or a] fiction”.63 
These two kinds of imagination - egoistic castle-building and disinterested castle-
building - will be the driving force behind the two kinds of immersed reading. I argued above 
that an immersed reading, in which we temporarily 'forget' the existence of the real world, 
will make it much easier to empathise with fictional characters, or with the perspective or 
attitude presented by a story. In order for this to work however, what is needed is the kind of 
disinterested imagination that Lewis describes. The kind of imagination used to enter fully 
into a story cannot be focused on the reader; it must be focused on the story. 
A reader who tends towards egoistic castle-building - the kind of reader that Lewis 
terms 'unliterary' - makes use of stories for her own purposes. The motivation behind 
engaging with stories is largely to glean new material for egoistic daydreams, which centre 
on the dreamer, or the reader. This kind of egoistic reading is not likely to contribute to the 
development of empathy, because the focus of the reader is on herself, and not on the story or 
the fictional characters it portrays. In addition to this, and critically important for the purposes 
of this discussion, any assessment that such a reader makes of a story - either literary or 
ethical - is likely to be similarly focused on the reader. This will mean that any evaluation of 
the moral reality of the story, or of the moral codes of any of the fictional characters, will be 
done in terms of the moral code of the reader, which in turn will limit what the reader can 
learn from the engagement. 
Also of concern with this kind of reading is the use of stories for the purposes of 
egoistic daydreams. Lewis argues that this kind of reading is harmful to the reader, creating 
unrealistic expectations and causing a corresponding dissatisfaction with reality. The reader 
who seeks out stories in which, for example, the schoolgirl heroine wins acclaim by rescuing 
another girl from a fire by scaling a drainpipe up the side of a burning building,64 or riding a 
borrowed circus horse bareback across the countryside in the middle of the night in order to 
rescue a kidnapped heiress65 is likely to feel some dissatisfaction with the more ordinary sort 
of school achievements. This concern is closely connected to concerns about the content in 
stories, which I will discuss further in Chapter Four. There is one element however, that is 
important for the present discussion. 
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The unrealistic expectations of the real world that are generated by this kind of 
reading seem closely tied to confusion about what is real, or possible, or likely. The reader 
who becomes dissatisfied with her own experience of school, for example, as a result of 
stories which portray school life as filled with such events as fires and kidnappings, is 
confused not only about what the reality of school life is generally like, but also about the 
overall desirability - or lack thereof - of fires and kidnappings. 
I think that this confusion could extend to moral issues. In the same way that a reader 
could become confused or unrealistic about what is possible in the real world, she could also 
become confused about what is morally right or appropriate in the real world. She might take 
moral claims made in a story out of context, accepting such claims uncritically and applying 
them inappropriately in the real world. In the same way that the schoolgirl is confused by a 
story about the kinds of events that are likely or possible in school life, she could be confused 
into thinking that certain acts are appropriate in reality because they are accepted, or even 
praised, in stories. Although it is natural, I think, that we are willing to accept a broader range 
of actions in fiction than in reality, it is important that we are able to distinguish between 
those actions or behaviours that would be appropriate in the real world, and those which are 
better confined to stories. A very common concern about children's stories, for example, is 
that they portray violent acts as, if not acceptable, at least without serious consequences. A 
child reader who engages with such stories - importantly, through the kind of egoistic reading 
described above - could come to believe that similar acts are equally acceptable in the real 
world. In effect, the child takes a moral claim or position from the moral content in the story 
out of context, and applies it to the real world. 
Since the aim of moral education is to avoid this kind of confusion by developing 
moral responsiveness, this kind of reading will be detrimental to moral development. A fully 
developed moral agent is a person who will be capable of recognising that what is acceptable 
within the moral reality of a particular story will not necessarily be acceptable in reality. The 
child reader will not yet be this kind of moral agent, but since it is our aim to help her to 
reach this point, we need to encourage her to read in such a way as to avoid this kind of 
confusion. The solution is to encourage children to read in a disinterested manner, rather than 
an egoistic one. 
A reader who tends towards disinterested castle-building will engage with each story 
on its own terms, entering into the fictional world and leaving herself behind. Such a reader 
will be far less likely to become confused about the real world, or to take moral claims out of 
context. The reason for this is that engaging with a story as an individual, and separate, 
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fictional reality (and by extension, a fictional moral reality), means that there is a distance 
between the reader's experience of the story and her experience of the real world. This may 
seem obvious, but the comparison I am making here is with an egoistic reading, in which the 
distinction between fiction and reality is blurred by the reader's focus on herself and on her 
own egoistic daydreams, meaning that her interest is only in the moral content in the story 
and how it might apply to her. By contrast, in a disinterested reading, the focus is on the story 
rather than on the reader, meaning that the reader is open to learning from the moral content 
of the story. 
The benefit that disinterested reading has for moral development is that it allows the 
child reader to learn how to assess fictional moral realities in terms of internal consistency 
first, and external considerations second (and after the initial reading). Instead of assessing 
fictional moral realities - or individual moral claims or perspectives presented in a story - in 
terms of how they relate to her own conception of the world, which would limit what the 
reader could learn from the story, a disinterested reading allows the child reader to engage 
with moral alternatives, and gives her the opportunity to develop her ability to critically 
assess such alternatives. 
At this point, let us return to my account of the ideal reader. The ideal reader is one 
who, a) immerses herself in the story and, b) does so in a disinterested way, which allows her 
to assess each fictional moral reality on its own terms. This kind of assessment involves 
looking for internal consistency, and assessing individual moral rules or claims presented in 
the story in terms of the overall moral reality that the story portrays. As an illustration of 
exactly what I mean by this, consider this passage from Mark Twain's The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn: 
It would get all around that Huck Finn helped a nigger to get his freedom, and if I was 
ever to see anybody from that town again, I'd be ready to get down and lick his boots 
for shame. That's just the way: a person does a lowdown thing, and then he don't want 
to take no consequences of it. Thinks as long as he can hide it, it ain't no disgrace. 
That was my fix exactly. The more I studied about this, the more my conscience went 
to grinding me, and the more wicked and lowdown and ornery I got to feeling. And at 
last, when it hit me all of  a sudden that here was the plain hand of Providence 
slapping me in the face and letting me know my wickedness was being watched all 
the time from up there in heaven, whilst I was stealing a poor old woman's nigger that 
hadn't ever done me no harm, and now was showing me there's One that's always on 
the lookout, and it ain't a-going to allow no such miserable doings to go only just so 
fur and no further, I most dropped in my tracks, I was so scared. Well, I tried the best 
I could to kinder soften it up somehow for myself, by saying I was brung up wicked, 
and so I warn't so much to blame, but something inside me kept saying, "There was 
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the Sunday school, you could a gone to it, and if you'd a done it they'd a learnt you 
there that people that acts as I'd been acting about that nigger goes to everlasting 
fire."66 
 
The moral rule or claim that is implied by Huck's agonising in this passage is that to help a 
slave run away from his owner is a mortal sin, punishable by eternal damnation and hellfire. 
There are two ways that a reader could respond to this claim. One way is to respond in terms 
of her own moral code. In that case, the result is almost certain to be a rejection of the moral 
claim that is being made here, except in the unlikely case of a reader who endorses slavery, in 
which case the result would be an endorsement of the claim. For the purposes of argument 
however, let us assume that the response is the former - a rejection of the claim that slavery is 
morally right, and that to interfere with it is therefore morally wrong. This seems like a good 
thing. The reader has not been influenced by this wrenching account of Huck's moral agony 
to the extent that she comes to accept the moral rule with which he is struggling. I do not 
want to claim that there is anything wrong with this. The problem here is in terms of moral 
development. The reader has not really learned anything from her engagement with the text. 
All she has done is to allow the moral content in the story to confirm a moral ideal that she 
already holds.   
The alternative is for the reader to set aside her own moral code, and assess the moral 
claim that this passage presents in terms of the moral reality presented by the story as a 
whole. The central moral ideal of this story is embodied by the friendship between Huck and 
Jim. Despite Huck's apparent belief to the contrary, every incident in the story serves to 
confirm that in helping Jim to escape, and in remaining loyal to his friend, Huck is doing the 
right thing. If Huck were to obey the moral rule that this passage discusses - if he were to do 
what he has been taught is the right thing to do - he would actually be doing the wrong thing, 
because such an action would go against the central moral ideal of the story.   
Although the end result is the same - in both cases the reader comes to the conclusion 
that it would be wrong for Huck to betray Jim by returning him to slavery - the crucial 
difference is in the way that the reader reaches this conclusion. In the first case - the egoistic 
reading - the reader does not learn anything of significance from the story, because she 
simply uses it as a means of confirming what she already believes. The egoistic reader is only 
interested in the content in the story. In the second case - the disinterested reading - the reader 
has to follow a process of critical assessment in order to reach her conclusion. She has to 
assess the moral rule, and the action that it dictates, in terms of the moral reality within which 
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it is situated, and so come to the conclusion that to follow this particular rule would be an 
inappropriate response to the situation. This kind of disinterested reading means that the 
reader is able to learn from the content of the story. It allows her to be guided by the author in 
taking up a particular attitude towards the events and characters portrayed in the story. In this 
way she not only engages with the moral content of the story, learning from it, but also 
develops her moral skills through assessing it.  
If a disinterested reading of a story opens the reader up to learn from the author, then 
we are still left with the possibility that the child reader could be negatively affected by what 
she learns. This kind of reading will not prevent her from being influenced by an immoral 
author. As I stated earlier, the protection that this kind of reading provides is a very minimal 
one. All that it can do is to prevent the child reader from taking the moral perspectives and 
claims she encounters in a story out of context.  I have emphasised throughout this project 
that an engagement with literature alone will not be sufficient for the development of moral 
agency. Teaching children to read in this way - a disinterested, immersed reading - is only the 
first step, and needs to be combined with both the development of critical reasoning skills and 
knowledge of the real world.  
Teaching a child to read stories in a disinterested manner will teach her to approach 
each fictional world as a separate entity, complete with a separate moral reality, which in turn 
will encourage her to recognise the differences between fictional worlds, and between 
fictional worlds and reality. This recognition is an important one for two reasons. The first is 
the one mentioned above, that recognising that the fictional world of the story is different to, 
and separate from, reality will prevent the child reader from taking any moral claims made in 
the story out of context, and so to recognise that the moral system portrayed in a story will 
not necessarily be either possible or desirable in reality. This prompts further consideration 
before the child incorporates anything that she learns through stories into her actions in the 
real world. The second reason is that this ability will have another important real world 
application. This kind of awareness that the fictional world is separate from reality - which 
makes the reader less likely to take any moral claims made in the story at face value - can be 
extended to the real world, to the awareness that what is morally acceptable or right in one set 
of circumstances will not necessarily be so in another.  
In addition, this awareness will make the child reader less likely to take moral claims 
from other sources - such as other people - at face value. To illustrate this point, consider this 
parallel between Huck's position in the above passage, and the position of a child in our real 
world who has been taught a moral rule by her society.    
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The moral rule that Huck is struggling with is something that he has been taught by 
his society. He has learned it by rote almost from infancy, and it is reinforced by the 
behaviour of the adults around him. He cannot give any reason in support of the rule except 
that it is what he has always been told is right. In struggling with it, and eventually rejecting 
it, Huck goes through a process of moral development. He searches for reasons to support 
this rule, but finds none.  In fact, instead of finding reasons “to harden me against him”67 he 
finds “only the other kind”.68  He finds only reasons to help Jim, and no reasons to turn him 
in. In making the decision to help Jim, Huck forms a new moral commitment, one that is 
supported by reasons rather than being simply the result of rote learning and fear. He comes 
to an awareness that he has to make a choice between two moral alternatives, and in the 
process learns not to accept the moral rules of his society uncritically. 
In the same way, through her engagement with stories the child reader will come to an 
awareness that moral alternatives exist, and that they might therefore also exist in the real 
world. Instead of simply accepting the moral rules that she is given by her society - or even 
by stories - therefore, she will learn to search for reasons to support her choices and in doing 
so she will form her own set of moral rules to guide her actions 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that in order to make the most of the contribution that literature can make to 
moral development we need to teach children to immerse themselves in stories. This kind of 
reading will contribute to the development of moral responsiveness, and particularly the 
development of a capacity for empathy. In addition, we need to encourage a particular kind of 
immersed reading - a disinterested reading - in which the child reader focuses on the story 
itself rather than on herself. This will contribute to the development of a capacity for the 
critical assessment of previously held moral content. 
The minimal protection provided by a disinterested, immersed reading of a text might 
be sufficient in the case of the adult reader, but in the case of the child reader there is still 
reason for concern about the effects of an encounter with an immoral author. To some extent 
I think that this is a concern we will simply have to live with, but we can attempt to minimise 
possible negative effects by considering the moral content in the stories we give to children. 
If we are going to make use of literature as a part of moral education we cannot avoid the 
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question of which books we should choose in order to further our goals. In Chapter Four I 
will discuss some of the possible criteria that could be used when choosing books for children 
to read.   
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Chapter Four: Choosing Books for Children 
 
Thus far my focus has been on the benefits of a particular approach to literature, rather than 
on the benefits that might be derived from the moral content of individual stories or kinds of 
literature. In Chapter Three I argued that in order to make the most of the contribution that 
literature can make to moral development, we need to teach children to read in a 
distinterested immersed way. I also argued that this kind of reading could provide some 
measure of protection against the possible negative effects the moral content in a story, by 
being open to learning from the moral content of the story, which will prevent children from 
taking moral claims or perspectives made in stories out of context. This protection is only 
minimal however, and will not protect the child reader from an encounter with an immoral 
author. While I think that this is simply a risk that we will have to take, we can take some 
steps towards minimising possible negative effects by paying attention to the moral content in 
stories.  
It is not my intention to argue that children should only be allowed to read certain 
kinds of stories. I argued in Chapter Two that limiting our selection of books to those that 
contain moral content of which we approve, because doing so will also limit the potential 
contribution that literature could make to moral development. However, I do want to argue 
that there are certain kinds of stories that will make a greater contribution to moral 
development than others, not because of their content, but because of the way in which this 
content is presented; the literary quality of the texts themselves. 
I have argued that it is important to encourage children to immerse themselves in 
stories, rather than focusing exclusively on literary criticism. This is not to say however, that 
the adults who choose books for children to read should not make use of literary criticism as 
a means of guiding their selection. Children's books are, after all, almost exclusively selected 
by adults - authors, publishers, librarians, parents and teachers. The choice of the individual 
child reader only comes right at the end of this process. It is therefore the responsibility of 
these adults to ensure that the child reader is presented with the best possible books from 
which to choose, and the various elements of literary criticism will, and should, play a role 
here. In this chapter I will discuss some possible criteria that could be used in making our 
selection. 
In his discussion on selecting books for children, Edward Rosenheim states that we 
should ask a series of questions: 
61 
 
Will this book call into play my child's imagination? Will it invite the exercise of 
genuine compassion or humour or even irony? Will it exploit his capacity for being 
curious? Will its language challenge his awareness of rhythms and structures? Will its 
characters and events call for - and even strengthen - his understanding of human 
motives and circumstances, of causes and effects? And will it provide him with a joy 
that is in some part the joy of achievement, of understanding, of triumphant encounter 
with the new?69 
 
In order to discuss these questions I will focus on two closely related issues: the question of 
whether we should privilege realist literature over fantasy literature or vice versa and the 
quality of portrayals of characters and situations, which is a key component in determining 
the literary quality of a text. 
 
Fantasy Literature vs. Realist Literature 
 
A basic approach to the question of content is to ask whether the events and situations 
portrayed in a story are appropriate for children. Although theories about the application of 
this approach differ, the general aim is the same in all cases: to protect children from material 
which could be upsetting or frightening to them, or which they are still too young to 
comprehend. This is relatively uncontroversial however, and will play an obvious role in the 
selection of books for children. More interesting is the debate about the suitability, for the 
child reader, of whole genres of literature. 
The content in any one story will fall into one of two very broad categories: realist 
fiction or fantasy literature. Within these categories are many different subgenres. Examples 
of realist fiction include historical fiction, mystery stories, adventure stories, family stories, 
and any number of other variations. The distinguishing feature of realist fiction is that the 
events it describes are, although not actually true as they are described, at least possible in the 
world as we know it. In many cases realist fiction includes events, people and places that are 
real, thereby increasing the realism of the story. Examples of fantasy literature include fairy 
tales, stories about other worlds (such as J.R.R. Tolkien's Middle Earth, or C.S. Lewis's 
Narnia), and stories that contain magic or other supernatural elements. Science fiction is 
generally included in this category, although certain kinds of science fiction stories could 
actually fit into the realist category, since they deal with events and technologies that are 
possible, although not yet actualised. The distinguishing feature of fantasy literature is that it 
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portrays events that cannot be explained by the laws of science or logic as we understand 
them, such as magic. 
There survives today a perceived trend in thought that views fantasy literature as 
unhealthy for children (and even adults) to read, and that instead they should be given only 
realist literature. The reasons for this are varied, but the most common include the view that 
fantasy literature is 'escapism', and the view that it will lead to the reader becoming confused 
about the nature of reality. Interestingly, when I searched for references to prove that this 
anti-fantasy trend is still alive and well, I found any number of articles, papers and books 
written in defence of fantasy, but none that specifically attacked fantasy. That said, the 
motivating force behind all of what I did find seems to be a response to such an attack. 
Nearly every paper involves an explanation of why 'they' are wrong when 'they' claim that 
children should not be allowed to read fantasy.70 That so many people - authors, literary 
scholars and readers - should feel the need to defend fantasy literature against it is evidence 
enough that this view still survives. 
In what follows I will defend fantasy literature against the two concerns mentioned 
above: that fantasy literature is 'escapism', and that it creates confusion in the reader about the 
nature of reality. I would like to stress however, that in defending fantasy literature I am not 
arguing against realist literature. Both kinds of literature are valuable and can contribute to 
moral development. However, I feel that it is important to make a reply to the strongly felt 
opposition to fantasy literature.  
 Escapism is defined as “the tendency to seek distraction and relief from 
unpleasant realities, especially by seeking entertainment or engaging in fantasy”.71 Fantasy, 
in this context, refers more to daydreaming, or castle-building, than to literary fantasy. 
Generally contrasted with realism, the term carries negative connotations suggesting that 
'escapists' are unable or unwilling to cope with reality, as well as connecting escapism (and 
more specifically daydreaming) with laziness. As a descriptive term the word is used in many 
different ways. Film reviews often contain the words “pure escapism”, which could easily be 
replaced with “pure entertainment”, meaning that the film has minimal subtlety and very little 
depth or meaning. In a literary context, the term 'escapism' is most commonly used to refer to 
fairy tales, fantasy and science fiction. Such stories are contrasted with realist literature, in 
which subjects are depicted as they appear in everyday life. Literary realism refers to 
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depictions of contemporary life and society that focus on everyday activities and experiences. 
The negative connotations associated with the word 'escapism' mean than many people have 
considered fantasy literature to be not only less valuable than realist literature, but possibly 
harmful to the reader, in whom it might promote 'escapist tendencies'. 
Ursula Le Guin72 argues that this general “anti-fiction” and specifically “anti-fantasy” 
trend of thought is closely connected to the typically Western association of pleasure with 
indulgence. She claims that the rejection of fiction and fantasy in highly technological 
societies is so strong that it could only stem from fear, and that this fear is connected to a 
particular work ethic and an orientation towards profit. What cannot be justified as 
educational, self-improving or profitable can only be self-indulgence, or in other words, 
escapism. Reading fiction is not work, it is something that we do for pleasure, and pleasure 
for its own sake is regarded as indulgence, if not outright sin. Fiction and fantasy are classed 
as childish or womanish or a waste of time because they do not result in any material gain. 
J.R.R. Tolkien makes a similar claim, arguing that in condemning escapism the critic of 
fantasy is confusing “the Escape of the Prisoner with the Flight of the Deserter”.73 He argues 
that escape is often necessary - he equates modern life with a prison, from which fantasy 
stories are our only, and essential escape - and even heroic, and that it should not be confused 
with the tendency to run away from reality.   
Le Guin argues that to equate fantasy with escapism (in the negative sense of the 
word) because it is 'not real', or because it has no relevance for real life, is mistaken. On the 
contrary, she claims that fiction and fantasy play an essential role in the development and 
training of the imagination, which in turn are absolutely essential to human nature and to the 
reality of our lives. Imagination, which she defines as “the free play of the mind, both 
intellectual and sensory [which results in] recreation, re-creation and recombination of what 
is known into what is new”,74 is essential for both art and science. The imagination however, 
requires discipline if we are to avoid its use becoming little more than egocentric 
daydreaming or wishful thinking. And one of the best ways to acquire the necessary 
discipline is by engaging with stories, and particularly with fantasy. 
C.S. Lewis offers a different defence of fantasy literature. He argues that the true 
'escapist' literature is not fantasy at all, but rather some varieties of what is called realist 
literature. In Chapter Three I discussed Lewis's concept of the 'unliterary', or egoistic reader, 
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who reads stories in order to gain material for egoistic daydreams. This kind of reader is 
seeking a form of escapism (in the negative sense). Because this kind of castle-building is so 
close to fantasy (in the psychological sense of the term) it is sometimes assumed that this 
kind of reader would like literary fantasies, and this leads to the fairly common assumption 
that literary fantasy is unhealthy for the reader. Lewis argues that this is not the case. On the 
contrary, the egoistic reader generally does not see the point in reading about “things that 
could never really happen”.75 These readers require that the setting of stories be as similar as 
possible to the real world with which they are familiar. This is due in part to an inertia in the 
imagination, which makes it possible to render real “only what they have read of a thousand 
times and seen a hundred times before”,76 and in part a desire to feel that the daydream, while 
unlikely, is still – at least in principle – possible.   
This brings me to the second concern that is expressed about fantasy literature; that it 
will confuse the reader by giving her an unrealistic view of the world. Lewis notes that  
there are earnest people who recommend realistic reading for everyone because, they 
say, it prepares us for real life, and who would, if they could, forbid fairy tales for 
children and romances for adults because these 'give a false picture of life' - in other 
words, deceive their readers.77 
 
However, Lewis argues that, instead of fantasy, it is those stories that have a “superficial or 
apparent realism of content”78 that are more likely to deceive their readers. Lewis argues that 
certain kinds of realist stories, while observing all natural laws and a “general ordinariness; 
the clothes, gadgets, food, houses, occupations and tone of the everyday world”,79 
nevertheless contain all manner of improbabilities, including “monstrous psychology and 
preposterous coincidence”.80   
He includes in this category those school stories - such as those mentioned in Chapter 
Two - in which the hero or heroine achieves recognition through various unlikely events and 
coincidences, as well as - for adult readers - stories of sudden inheritance and unlikely 
success. The reader of such stories 
knows the daydream is unrealised; [yet] he demands that it should be, in principle, 
realisable … and the more completely a man’s reading is a form of egoistic castle-
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building, the more he will demand a certain superficial realism, and the less he will 
like the fantastic.81 
 
It is this kind of literature, Lewis argues, that gives the reader a mistaken impression of the 
world. The superficial realism of the setting makes it far easier for the reader to believe that 
other aspects of the story are not only possible, but also likely. In order to avoid creating the 
kind of unliterary reader described above, we should be careful to avoid selecting books that 
have only this superficial realism. Again, I would like to emphasise that this is not an 
argument against realist literature in general. Not all realist literature is deceptive, and 
certainly the ideal reader would not be deceived by the kind of books preferred by the 
egoistic reader. In making our selection of books for children to read however, we need to be 
aware of the potential for deception, and choose accordingly. 
Rather than demanding realism of content, or on the contrary, no realism of content at 
all, Lewis makes another suggestion: that we should demand “that every book should have as 
much of this realism as it pretends to have”.82  By this he means that if a book claims to be 
representing the world as it is, then this is what it ought to do, but that if representation of the 
real world is not the goal of the book, then we should not condemn it for failing to do so.  
 
The Portrayal of Characters and Situations 
 
The implication of the position I have stated above is that the distinction between fantasy and 
realism is not what is morally important. Instead, it is the characters and their actions and 
interactions that are of moral importance. These are what make up the moral content in the 
story, but are also closely related to the moral content of the story. The question of realism is 
closely connected to the question of literary quality, since the representation of the world as it 
is (or as it is not) will be accomplished through the use of language and technique employed 
in the text. I have spoken thus far about realism of content, which involves probability or 
correspondence with the real world, stories with a recognisable 'real world' social, historical, 
political and everyday setting. Lewis distinguishes this from realism of presentation, which 
involves exact details given in descriptions; “the art of bringing something close to us, 
making it palpable and vivid, by sharply observed or sharply imagined detail”.83 Realism of 
presentation is possible in any kind of literature, and a high level of such realism will 
contribute to the literary quality of a work. 
                                                          
81
 Lewis, 56 
82
 Lewis, 67 
83
 Lewis, 57 
66 
 
This realism of presentation is important in two key areas: the creation of the fictional 
world of the story, and the portrayal of the fictional characters that inhabit it. In Chapter Two 
I argued that literature contributes to moral education by giving the child reader the 
opportunity to experience new worlds and societies, and that these experiences with what is 
different will contribute both to the awareness that moral and social alternatives exist, and to 
the ability to assess these alternatives by making comparisons between them. The stories that 
will provide the best means of developing this awareness and ability will be those that create 
a fictional world that is both detailed and internally consistent. 
The importance of realism of presentation in the creation of a fictional world is 
connected to the development of critical reasoning skills. The range of possibility with regard 
to correspondence with the real world is significant. A fictional world may be identical to our 
own, its only fictional elements being the characters and actual events that it portrays, or it 
may be similar to our own, with only a few key differences (such as a difference in its legal, 
social or moral structures), or it may be entirely different from our own. Internal consistency 
is what is important here. A fictional world that is internally consistent is one in which social, 
historical and moral structures fit together as a coherent whole. A fictional world in which, as 
in our society, the various struggles for woman's suffrage were successful, cannot be 
consistent if its social and legal structures do not reflect that (if women do not have the right 
to vote in this particular fictional world, for example). In order for such a fictional world to 
be consistent, its history must differ from our own in all the relevant details. The greater the 
detail that is included in the portrayal of each fictional world, the clearer these differences 
and similarities will become, which in turn will make a critical assessment of it easier.   
Also of great importance is realism of presentation of fictional characters. In Chapter 
Two I argued that stories contribute to moral development by giving us the opportunity for 
empathy, and further, that they make it easier for us to empathise with people than we would 
find it in real life, because they give us access to the thoughts and emotions of fictional 
characters. A higher degree of realism in the presentation of fictional characters will therefore 
mean that the experience of an emotional engagement with those characters will be richer and 
more beneficial than it would otherwise be. The more complex and detailed the portrayal of a 
fictional character, the easier it will be for the reader to empathise with that character, and the 
more she will learn from the engagement. In encountering texts that give a subtle, complex 
portrayal of characters and human interactions, the reader learns to notice the nuances that are 
necessary in making moral decisions.  
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If the reader encounters only flat or stereotypical characters, on the other hand, this 
will hinder the development of moral responsiveness. A flat, stereotypical portrayal of a 
character or a situation often encourages sentimentality, which is the enjoyment of an 
emotion for the sake of the emotion, rather than for the sake of its object. The general 
objection to sentimentality is that it misrepresents the world in order to allow us to indulge 
our emotions. This is similar to Lewis's objection to so-called realist stories that misrepresent 
reality in order to allow the reader to indulge in egoistic daydreaming.  
Mary Midgley objects to sentimentality on the grounds that it “distorts expectations; it 
can make people unable to deal with the real world”.84 Sentimentality involves a kind of self-
deception, which is bad because - as Lewis suggests - it may lead to an inability to react 
appropriately to the objects that are the proper focus of the emotion in question. 
Sentimentality, while still a part of the moral content in the story - because it will affect 
decisions about what is portrayed - also affects the moral content of the story in that it affects 
the way in which certain characters and actions are portrayed. 
Mark Jefferson argues that sentimentality involves a specific kind of fiction, which 
focuses on “the sweetness … and vulnerability of the emotions’ objects”85. This kind of 
emphasis almost always involves an oversimplification of the nature of the object. This has 
moral significance: an overly simplistic view of an object will impair our moral vision of it, 
and of objects related to it. What results is a “parody of moral appraisal”86 in which an object 
or person is portrayed as entirely good and innocent. This is problematic because  
the unlikely creature and moral caricature that is someone unambiguously worthy of 
sympathetic response has its natural counterpart in a moral caricature of something 
unambiguously worthy of hated.87 
 
In other words, something that is wholly good and innocent and vulnerable is likely to be 
viewed as always under threat, and those things that pose the threat are likely to be cast as 
wholly evil in a similarly simplistic manner. A sentimental reader who easily loves and pities 
the good will just as easily hate and vilify its opposition. A sentimental text will invite its 
readers to take up this kind of one-dimensional attitude towards certain characters. We need 
to avoid giving children books that will encourage this kind of simplistic emotional response 
to the world and other people.   
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A classic instance of sentimentality is what Humphrey Carpenter refers to as the 
“Beautiful Child”,88of which Frances Hodgson Burnett's Little Lord Fauntleroy is a good 
example. Cedric Errol is a young American boy who learns that he is the heir to a British 
earldom. His titled grandfather disapproves of Cedric's American mother, whom Cedric calls 
“Dearest”, and Cedric must win over the hard-hearted Earl before she is allowed to join him 
at the ancestral home. This he does without difficulty. Cedric is the perfect child, and  
it seemed as if there never had been a more fortunate baby. In the first place, he was 
always well, and so he never gave any one trouble; in the second place, he had so 
sweet a temper and ways so charming that he was a pleasure to every one; and in the 
third place, he was so beautiful to look at that he was quite a picture. Instead of being 
a bald-headed baby, he started in life with a quantity of soft, fine, gold-colored hair, 
which curled up at the ends, and went into loose rings by the time he was six months 
old; he had big brown eyes and long eyelashes and a darling little face; he had so 
strong a back and such splendid sturdy legs, that at nine months he learned suddenly 
to walk; his manners were so good, for a baby, that it was delightful to make his 
acquaintance. He seemed to feel that everyone was his friend, and when any one 
spoke to him, when he was in his carriage in the street, he would give the stranger one 
sweet, serious look with the brown eyes, and then follow it with a lovely, friendly 
smile; and the consequence was, that there was not a person in the neighborhood of 
the quiet street where he lived—even to the groceryman at the corner, who was 
considered the crossest creature alive—who was not pleased to see him and speak to 
him. And every month of his life he grew handsomer and more interesting.89 
 
This is a very pleasant picture, but the idea of childhood that it creates is a highly idealised 
and unrealistic one. If we compare this description to that of Mary Lennox, the heroine of 
Hodgson Burnett's later book, The Secret Garden, we find that they are on opposite ends of 
the spectrum: 
When Mary Lennox was sent to Misselthwaite Manor to live with her uncle 
everybody said she was the most disagreeable-looking child ever seen. It was true, 
too. She had a little thin face and a little thin body, thin light hair and a sour 
expression. Her hair was yellow, and her face was yellow because she had been born 
in India and had always been ill in one way or another. Her father had held a position 
under the English Government and had always been busy and ill himself, and her 
mother had been a great beauty who cared only to go to parties and amuse herself 
with gay people. She had not wanted a little girl at all, and when Mary was born she 
handed her over to the care of an Ayah, who was made to understand that if she 
wished to please the Memsahib she must keep the child out of sight as much as 
possible. So when she was a sickly, fretful, ugly little baby she was kept out of the 
way, and when she became a sickly, fretful, toddling thing she was kept out of the 
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way also. She never remembered seeing familiarly anything but the dark faces of her 
Ayah and the other native servants, and as they always obeyed her and gave her her 
own way in everything, because the Memsahib would be angry if she was disturbed 
by her crying, by the time she was six years old she was as tyrannical and selfish a 
little pig as ever lived. The young English governess who came to teach her to read 
and write disliked her so much that she gave up her place in three months, and when 
other governesses came to try to fill it they always went away in a shorter time than 
the first one. So if Mary had not chosen to really want to know how to read books she 
would never have learned her letters at all.90  
 
These two descriptions are as different as the two children they portray. Unlike Cedric, who 
is born perfect and remains that way without any discernable influence from anyone or 
anything, Mary is the product of her surroundings. This passage not only describes Mary, but 
shows the reader why she is as she is, giving her depth and making her a highly realistic 
character.  
Sentimentality lowers the literary quality of a text. There are certain aesthetic features 
of texts that are connected with sentimentality, such as trite phrases, stock metaphors, 
vagueness and a lack of substance. More importantly, when we judge a text to be sentimental 
it is usually because the characters, events or actions portrayed are idealised or implausible, 
making them somehow “shallow or insincere or dishonest”.91 This is an ethical judgement as 
well as an aesthetic one. Marcia Eaton argues that this is because a person who found such a 
description to be accurate “would not be likely to deal adequately or appropriately with 
persons who experience [the situation that is being portrayed]”.92 This is a reflection on both 
the writer and the reader who appreciates such a description. When we call a writer 
sentimental we generally mean that he is somehow shallow, self-indulgent, hypocritical or 
dishonest. In so saying we are not judging only his artistic merit, but his merit as an ethical 
being. Similarly, a sentimental reader will have only a shallow response to a text, and this 
shallow, easy response is likely to result in a similar response to actual ethical concerns. 
Midgley argues that sentimentality could have an even stronger negative effect than 
the cultivation of simplistic emotions, because sentimentality is closely connected to 
brutality. Taking pleasure in softer, gentler emotions for their own sake could easily lead to 
taking pleasure in harsh, brutal ones as well. She connects sentimentality to a “flight from, 
and contempt of, real people by comparison with imaginary ones”,93 something just as likely 
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to occur in negative fictions as in positive ones. In the same way that a preference for stories 
that allow for egoistic daydreaming could result in dissatisfaction with the real world, a 
preference for stories that allow us to indulge our emotions for the sake of those emotions 
could result in a distortion of our emotional responses to reality. 
In selecting books for children to read therefore, we need to choose books that are 
non-sentimental in nature. If the creation and enjoyment of sentimental stories is connected to 
a lack of moral depth and perception, or to ethical dishonesty, then there is likely to be a 
similar connection between non-sentimental stories and virtue. In encountering stories  
that present human experience subtly, we can learn to notice the very nuances that are 
often required if one is to make correct ethical assessments.94 
 
Encounters with non-sentimental stories therefore, will be beneficial for the development of 
moral responsiveness. A complex, subtle portrayal of a fictional character will not only make 
it easier for the reader to empathise with that character because of the detail provided, but 
will also make the act of empathy itself a more valuable experience, because the complexities 
of the fictional character are the same kind of complexities that the reader will encounter in 
real people.   
In conclusion, when making our selection of books for children, we need to keep in 
mind two criteria. First, instead of choosing realist literature rather than fantasy, or vice versa, 
we need to select stories that have “as much of this realism as [they] pretend to have”,95 and 
which will therefore not encourage the kind of egoistic reading that could lead to the child 
reader becoming confused about the nature of reality, or taking moral claims made in stories 
out of context. And second, we need to select stories that create fictional worlds and 
characters that are realistic, detailed and complex and in so doing, engage and develop the 
imagination of the child reader in such a way as to allow her to benefit from the experience. 
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Conclusion 
The approach I have outlined in this project is not going to provide all the answers. There 
remains the question of how, exactly, we should go about teaching children to read in this 
manner. To answer that will require further study and empirical research into the 
effectiveness of different options, and this would have to be a long term project in order to 
study the effects on children as they grow up.  
No method of teaching will provide a guarantee. In any programme of moral 
education, luck and chance play a significant role. Those children lucky enough to be born 
into families that value reading, as I was, will in all likelihood develop these moral skills as a 
natural by-product of reading and the creativity that it nurtures. But since not every child will 
be as fortunate, I think that an important first step will be to provide an environment that 
allows for this kind of engagement with stories. I think that while this is often provided 
during the early years of education, it tends to be gradually pushed aside in favour of other 
goals that are considered more important. What we need to do is preserve the space necessary 
for the exercise and development of the imagination, and maintain the awareness that this is 
connected to moral growth as well. 
In Chapter Four I referred to Ursula Le Guin's claim that the imagination is essential 
to human nature, and that without the free play of the imagination, neither art nor science 
would be possible. She also claims that the imagination requires training; that “free” in this 
sense does not mean undisciplined. This play of the imagination, which is the source of not 
only our intellectual achievements, but also our moral capacities, requires not just the 
freedom to grow but also structure to support it. Stories provide us with this structure.  
Whatever the necessary details of a programme of moral education will be, we need to keep 
this goal in mind. We need to provide a space in which the imagination of the child can grow 
and develop freely, without being restricted by the view that imagination and stories are a 
childish indulgence and something to be outgrown. We need to preserve and encourage the 
capacity for creative responses to the world, and make use of this ability in morality. And we 
need to provide children with stories that will enable them to do all this, and which will, in 
Rosenheim's words, provide them with the “joy that is in some part the joy of achievement, 
of understanding, of triumphant encounter with the new”96.  
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